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 Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human 
Rights 
 Christopher  McCrudden * 
 Abstract 
 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of  ‘ dignity ’ 
or  ‘ human dignity ’ in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of  ‘ dignity ’ , 
beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial 
decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common under-
standing of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning 
of dignity is therefore context-speciﬁ c, varying signiﬁ cantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for 
principled decision-making, dignity seems open to signiﬁ cant judicial manipulation, increas-
ing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its signiﬁ cant attractions to both 
judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of sub-
stantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not 
just coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue 
that the concept of  ‘ human dignity ’ plays an important role in the development of human 
rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to 
particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication. 
 *  FBA; Professor of Human Rights Law, Oxford University; Fellow, Lincoln College, Oxford; Overseas Af-
ﬁ liated Professor, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank the following for reading and 
discussing earlier drafts: Gerald Neuman, Benedict Kingsbury, Joseph Weiler, Barbara Havelkova, Robin 
Allen, Tony Honoré, Nicholas Hatziz, Denise Réaume, John Finnis, Jeremy Waldron, Michael Rosen, Kat-
ja Ziegler, Catharine McKinnon, Robert Howse, Paolo Carozza, and William Twining. I am also grateful 
to participants at discussions of earlier versions of the article at the University of Notre Dame Law School, 
Hull University, the University of Michigan Law School, and, most particularly, at the NYU Institute for 
International Law and Justice Colloquium. 
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 So many roads, so much at stake 
 So many dead ends, I’m at the edge of the lake 
 Sometimes I wonder what it’s gonna take 
 To ﬁ nd dignity 1 
 The 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a suit-
able opportunity to reﬂ ect on one of the key concepts which underpins and informs the 
human rights enterprise. Due signiﬁ cantly to its centrality in both the United Nations 
Charter 2 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 the concept of  ‘ human dig-
nity ’ now plays a central role in human rights discourse. 4 The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) both state that all human rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person. 5 Dignity is becoming commonplace in the legal texts pro-
viding for human rights protections in many jurisdictions. It is used frequently in judicial 
decisions, for example justifying the removal of restrictions on abortion in the United 
States, 6 in the imposition of restrictions on dwarf throwing in France, 7 in overturning 
laws prohibiting sodomy in South Africa, 8 and in the consideration of physician-assisted 
suicide in Europe. 9 But what does dignity mean in these contexts? Can it be a basis for 
human rights, a right in itself, or is it simply a synonym for human rights? In particular, 
what role does the concept of dignity play in the context of human rights adjudication? 
 1   Finding Human Dignity in the History of Ideas 
 The incorporation of the concept of  ‘ human dignity ’ in the Universal Declaration was 
the culmination of a signiﬁ cant historical evolution of the concept. Although the story 
is complex, for present purposes we can identify, since Roman times, several main (over-
lapping) developments of dignity as a Western philosophical-cum-political concept. 10 
 The concept of  dignitas hominis in classical Roman thought largely meant  ‘ status ’ . 
Honour and respect should be accorded to someone who was worthy of that honour 
 1  Bob Dylan,  Dignity (1963). 
 2  Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031, UNTS 993, 3 Bevans 1153. 
 3  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810, at 71 (1948). 
 4  See, generally, D. Kretzmer and E. Klein,  The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002). 
 5  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 
UN GAOR Supp (No 16), at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No. 16), at 52, UN Doc A/6316 
(1966), 999 UNTS 171. 
 6  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 US 833 (1992). 
 7  Wackenheim v. France , Comm. No. 854/1999: France, 26 Feb. 2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999. 
 8  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 6 BHRC 127 (CC, 1998), 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1517 (CC). 
 9  Pretty v. United Kingdom , 35 EHRR (2002) 1. 
 10  The entry by Bayertz,  ‘ Menschenwürde ’ , in H.G. Sandkühler (ed.),  Enzyklopädie Philosophie (1999), Band 
1, at 824 – 826, is particularly helpful. I am grateful to Michael Rosen for drawing it to my attention 
and for sharing with me his illuminating 2007 Boston University Benedict lectures: ‘“The Shibboleth of 
All Empty-headed Moralists”: The Place of Dignity in Ethics and Political Philosophy’, which helped me 
enormously in understanding the role of dignity in the history of ideas. 
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and respect because of a particular status that he or she had. So, appointment to par-
ticular public ofﬁ ces brought with it  dignitas . As Cancik writes, the term  ‘ denotes wor-
thiness, the outer aspect of a person’s social role which evokes respect, and embodies 
the charisma and the esteem presiding in ofﬁ ce, rank or personality ’ . 11 Indeed,  digni-
tas was not conﬁ ned to humans and applied to institutions and the state itself. This 
concept of dignity has long been incorporated in some legal systems in the private 
law context as the basis for providing protection for dignity in the sense of  ‘ status ’ , 
 ‘ reputation ’ , and  ‘ privileges ’ . The English Bill of Rights of 1689, for instance, referred 
to  ‘ the Crown and royal dignity ’ . 12 In legal systems based on Roman law, dignity was 
seen as a right of personality and status, and criminal and civil remedies were fre-
quently provided if dignity in this sense was infringed. 13 In South Africa, for example, 
it was recognized in the private-law sphere, deriving from Roman-Dutch law, that 
 ‘ [i]nfringement of a person’s  dignitas constituted a delict and compensation could be 
claimed with the  actio iniuriarum ’ . 14 In the international sphere, this concept of  ‘ dig-
nity ’ was frequently used to refer to the status of sovereign states 15 and, by extension, 
to the status of ambassadorial and consular staff serving their countries abroad. 16 
 Only in scattered classical Roman writing was a second, broader, concept of dignity 
present, particularly in Cicero, where  dignitas  referred also to the dignity of human 
beings as human beings, not dependent on any particular additional status. In this use of 
dignity, man is contrasted with animals:  ‘  … [i]t is vitally necessary for us to remember 
always how vastly superior is man’s nature to that of cattle and other animals; their only 
thought is for bodily satisfactions  … . Man’s mind, on the contrary, is developed by study 
and reﬂ ection  … . From this we may learn that sensual pleasure is wholly unworthy of 
the dignity of the human race. ’ 17 Taken in this way, where human beings are regarded 
as having a certain worth by virtue of being human, the concept of human dignity raises 
important questions such as  ‘ What kind of beings are we? How do we appropriately 
express the kind of beings we are? ’ 18 Radically different answers are possible, of course, 
and therein lies the root of the problem with the concept of human dignity. 
 11  Cancik,  ‘ “ Dignity of Man ” and  “ Personal ” in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De Ofﬁ ciis I 
105 – 107 ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 4, at 19. 
 12  The Bill of Rights (Act) 1689 Cap II (36), Art. II. Compare the Act of Settlement 1701. 
 13  Chaskalson,  ‘ Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 4, at 133, 
135. 
 14  Kroeze,  ‘ Human Dignity in Constitutional Law in South Africa ’ , in European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law,  The Principle of Respect for Human Dignity (Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar, Montpel-
lier, 2 – 6 July 1998), (1998), available at:  www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL-STD(1998)026-e.asp ), 
at 87, 88. Honoré has identiﬁ ed this development with Ulpian and links this with contemporary hu-
man rights law developments, in that in a society which recognizes wrongs to personality, dignity serves 
among other things to point to the respects in which all human beings are equal and in which that equal-
ity is to be given effect in law: see T. Honoré,  Ulpian: Pioneer of Human Rights (2nd edn, 2002). 
 15  Resnick and Suk,  ‘ Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereign-
ty ’ , 55  Stanford L Rev (2003) 1921. 
 16  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, 500 UNTS 95, Arts 22, 29. 
 17  Cicero,  De Ofﬁ ciis, I , at 30. 
 18  DiSanto,  ‘ The Threat of Commodity-consciousness to Human Dignity ’ , in R. Duffy and A. Gambatese, 
 Made in God’s Image: The Catholic Vision of Human Dignity (1999) 54, at 57. 
 658     EJIL  19 (2008),  655 – 724 
 From that time, essentially three strategies have been adopted in trying to answer 
these questions. The ﬁ rst is, broadly, religiously based  – we can answer the questions 
by seeing them as linked to the supernatural. The second strategy is philosophical  – 
we can answer these questions by using philosophical rigour. The third is historical  – 
we can answer these questions by seeing what particular types of actions have taken 
place that we consider to constitute a violation of human dignity. These three strate-
gies can be seen as playing off against each other continuously. Each of the major 
developments in the understanding and use of dignity illustrates one or more of these 
strategies in operation. 
 During the Middle Ages, with the ferment of debate in intellectual circles about the 
relationship between God and Man, the idea of  dignitas came to be used as the way of 
distinguishing between Man and other creatures, as it had in Cicero. The humanists 
attempted to reconcile classical thought and dogmatic theology by emphasizing the 
idea of mankind as having dignity because Man is made in the image of God, distin-
guishing Man from other species. As Arieli has argued,  ‘ The expression  “ the inherent 
dignity of man ”  … deﬁ nes the ontological status of man which derives ultimately from 
the fundamental conceptions of the West created by the fusion of Jewish-Christian 
monotheism with those derived from classical and humanistic conceptions of man. ’ 19 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church incorporates this idea of Man as made in the 
image of God as central to its conception of human dignity. 
 Of all visible creatures only man is  ‘ able to know and love his creator ’ . He is  ‘ the only creature 
on earth that God has willed for its own sake ’ , and he alone is called to share, by knowledge 
and love, in God’s own life. It was for this end that he was created, and this is the fundamental 
reason for his dignity  … Being in the image of God the human individual possesses the dignity 
of a person, who is not just something, but someone. He is capable of self-knowledge, of self-
possession and of freely giving himself and entering into communion with other persons. And 
he is called by grace to a covenant with his Creator, to offer him a response of faith and love that 
no other creature can give in his stead. 20 
 We can identify an interesting example of the practical uses to which the emerging 
idea of dignity as inherent in Man, and thus worthy of protection, was put. In  On the 
Law of War and Peace , published in 1625, 21 Hugo Grotius considered how we should 
treat the remains of slain enemies, and this resulted in a long excursus on why funeral 
rites were important. In an important passage, he concluded: 
 [T]he most obvious explanation is to be found in the dignity of man, who surpassing other 
creatures, it would be a shame, if his body were left to be devoured by beasts of prey.  … For to be 
tore by wild beasts  … is to be robbed of those honours, in death, which are due to our common 
 19  Arieli,  ‘ On the Necessary and Sufﬁ cient Conditions for the Emergence of the Dignity of Man and His 
Rights ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 4, at 1, 9. 
 20  The Catechism of the Catholic Church , Part One: The Profession of Faith, Section 2: The Profession of 
the Christian Faith, Chap. 1, Art. 1, paras. 6 and 356 – 357, available at : www.vatican.va/archive/
catechism/p1s2c1p6.htm (internal citation omitted). 
 21  H. Grotius,  De Jure Belli ac Pacis (trans. A.C. Campbell, London, 1814), Bk II, chap. 19. 
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nature.  … Consequently the rights of burial, the discharge of which forms one of the ofﬁ ces of 
humanity, cannot be denied even to enemies, whom a state of warfare has not deprived of the 
rights and nature of men. 22 
 As we can see from this passage, being made in the image of God meant that Man 
was endowed with gifts which distinguished Man from animals. The humanists of the 
Renaissance (and before that Thomas Aquinas 23 ) identiﬁ ed dignity as an important 
bridge between classical Roman thinking and Church doctrine in another important 
way. They argued that one of the most important of the gifts of God to Man was the gift 
of reason. Using reason, therefore, came to be closely connected with the idea of dig-
nity. In his famous and inﬂ uential 24 oration  On the Dignity of Man , published in 1486, 
Pico della Mirandola argued that at the root of Man’s dignity is the ability to choose to 
be what he wants to be, and that this is a gift from God.  ‘ It is given to him to have that 
which he chooses and to be that which he wills. ’ 25 The idea of dignity as now divorced 
from ofﬁ ce and hierarchy became central to the use of dignity in this tradition. 
 The subsequent development of dignity drew substantially on the importance of Man 
as having the capacity of reason, whilst dropping the religious elements of humanist 
writings such as those of Pico. We now move more squarely to  ‘ the central existential 
claim of modernity  – man’s autonomy, his capacity to be lord of his fate and the shaper 
of his future ’ . 26 In the Enlightenment, the dignity of Man in this sense came to be devel-
oped philosophically, and used as the basis, most famously, of Immanuel Kant’s use 
of the concept. It would be rash, indeed, for a non-Kantian scholar to purport to get 
fully to grips with Kant’s use of the idea, since it is notoriously contested territory, but 
several aspects of Kant’s use of the term seem clear. First, although it is anything but 
clear what exactly he intended, a passage in which the term is used in the  Metaphys-
ics of Morals has become the best-known source for the subsequent belief that Kant’s 
understanding of human dignity required that individuals should be treated as ends 
and not simply as means to an end. 27 Secondly, over time, this connection between 
dignity and Kant has become probably the most often cited non-religiously-based con-
ception of dignity. Some, indeed, regard him as  ‘ the father of the modern concept of 
human dignity ’ . 28 Thirdly, whether rightly or wrongly, the conception of dignity most 
closely associated with Kant is the idea of dignity as autonomy; that is, the idea that 
 22  In  ibid., Bk II, chap. 19. Compare the provisions in bilateral agreements relating to the preservation of the 
dignity and aesthetic character of the cemeteries by the state in which the cemeteries are located, where 
the cemeteries contain the war dead of another state. See, e.g., Netherlands – US Agreement on American 
Military Cemeteries, 1970, TIAS 6979; US – Panama Agreement Concerning the Use of Corozal Cemetry, 
1999. 
 23  See J. Finnis,  Aquinas (1998), at 176 – 180, 280. 
 24  Arieli,  supra note 19, at 10. 
 25  P. della Mirandola,  On the Dignity of Man (trans. C. Glenn Wallis, ed. Hackett Publishing Company, 1965, 
with an Introduction by Paul J.W. Miller), at 5. 
 26  Arieli,  supra note 19, at 12. 
 27  Kant,  ‘ Metaphysics of Morals ’ , Section 38 of the  Doctrine of Virtue (Ak. 6:462). 
 28  Bognetti,  ‘ The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitutionalism ’ , in G. Nolte (ed.), 
 European and US Constitutionalism , Science and Technique of Democracy No. 37 (2005), at 75, 79. 
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to treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous individuals able to choose 
their destiny. 
 Political philosophy from a somewhat different tradition, however, contributed to the 
popularization of dignity, as it became closely connected with the growth of republi-
canism. In the French Revolution of the 18th century,  ‘ dignities ’ (in the sense of aris-
tocratic privileges) were extended to every citizen by the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen. 29 Thomas Paine, writing in 1791 in reply to Burke’s attack 
on the French Revolution, partly bases his political theory on  ‘ the natural dignity of 
man ’ . 30 The connection between Republicanism, particularly of the French variety, 
and the concept of human dignity is even more prominent in the writings of Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Both in the  Vindication of the Rights of Man (1790) and the  Vindication 
of the Rights of Women (1796), Wollstonecraft uses the language of dignity to describe 
the appropriate state of women and men in her preferred political system. In William 
Wordsworth’s 1805  Prelude , the concept of the  ‘ dignity of individual man ’ is also used, as 
a counterpoint to the idea that the value of Man is to be judged only by economic capac-
ity and contribution. 31 By 1848, in a text published in Paris that year, Charles Renou-
vier was able conﬁ dently to assert that a  ‘ Republic is a state which best reconciles the 
interests and the dignity of each individual with the interests and dignity of everyone ’ . 32 
Dignity also took on a much more communitarian face, in part due to the common 
association of dignity and communitarianism with republicanism. The philosophy of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau has often been thought to bring a more communitarian ﬂ avour 
to justify human rights,  ‘ exhibit[ing] more concern for equality and fraternity, and less 
exclusive emphasis on liberty ’ than that prevalent in North American traditions. 33 The 
inﬂ uence of Rousseau on Latin America, for example, as Paolo Carozza argues, strongly 
inﬂ uenced the development of an approach to human rights that was distinctive, being 
committed in particular to the importance of equality, education, and material security. 
Dignity, with a communitarian emphasis, thus appears to have become closely con-
nected with republicanism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
 The concept of dignity came to be used as a rallying cry for a variety of other social 
and political movements advocating speciﬁ c types of social reform during the 19th 
century. One of Friedrich Schiller’s epigrams,  Würde des Menschen (1798), puts 
well the connection between dignity and social conditions which was beginning to 
develop:  ‘ [g]ive him food and shelter;/When you have covered his nakedness, dignity 
will follow by itself. ’ 34 In Europe and in Latin America, dignity came to be particularly 
 29  Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789, Art. 6:  ‘ [a]ll citizens, being equal in the eyes of 
the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their 
abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents ’ . 
 30  T. Paine,  Rights of Man : Part the First (1791). 
 31  Wordsworth,  The Prelude (1805), Book Thirteenth, lines 76 – 88. 
 32  C. Renouvier,  Manuel Républicain de l’homme et du citoyen ((1848); with introduction by M. Agulhon, 
1981), at 93. I am grateful to Rebecca Scott for drawing my attention to this reference. 
 33  Carozza,  ‘ From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human 
Rights ’ , 25  Human Rights Quarterly (2003) 281, at 300. 
 34  Cancik,  supra note 11, at 36. 
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associated with the abolition of slavery. Simon Bolivar, the Latin American military 
leader, statesman, and icon, justiﬁ ed the abolition of slavery as a  ‘ shameless violation 
of human dignity ’ and laws perpetuating it as  ‘ sacrilege ’ . 35 One of the decrees of the 
French Republic established as a result of the revolution of 1848 abolished slavery as 
 ‘ an affront to human dignity ’ . 36 The idea of the  ‘ dignity of labour ’ was used to encap-
sulate some of the egalitarian ambitions of these social movements, as well as provid-
ing a rallying cry by the growing Labour Movement to mobilize the working classes 
and argue for the state to provide social welfare. 37 Ferdinand Lassalle, a leading social-
ist and founder of Germany’s Social Democratic Party, argued, for example, that the 
state had the duty to  ‘ improve the situation of the lower classes, who had fallen into 
poverty and starvation, and thus provide a true humane existence for everyone ’ . 38 
 The prevalence of the use of dignity in European political discourse during the 19th 
century was not without its critics, both from the left and the right. Arthur Schopen-
hauer’s 1837 critique of Kant condemned the use of  ‘ human dignity ’ as contentless: 
 ‘ … this expression  “ Human Dignity, ” once it was uttered by Kant, became the shibbo-
leth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For behind that imposing formula 
they concealed their lack, not to say, of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which 
was possessed of an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their readers 
would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a  “ dignity ” that they would 
be quite satisﬁ ed. ’ 39 In 1847, Karl Marx denounced the use of dignity by a fellow social-
ist as a  ‘ refuge from history in morality ’ . 40 In 1872, Friedrich Nietzsche railed against 
the ideas of the  ‘ dignity of man ’ and the  ‘ dignity of labour ’ , judging them to be merely 
the outpourings of a sentimental egalitarianism used to persuade those who toiled to 
continue to do so. For Nietzsche, individuals had dignity only when they were used 
as instruments:  ‘ every human being  … only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of the 
genius, consciously or unconsciously; from this we may immediately deduce the ethi-
cal conclusion, that  “ man in himself ” , the absolute man possesses neither dignity, not 
rights, nor duties; only as a wholly determined being serving unconscious purposes 
can man excuse his existence ’ . 41 
 35  Simón Bolivar, Message to the Congress of Bolivia (Lima, 25 May 1826), quoted in Carozza,  supra note 
33, at 301. 
 36  Decree of 27 Apr. 1848, Preamble. 
 37  Alan Flanders has argued, e.g., that the value of a trade union to its members is  ‘ less in its economic 
achievement than in its capacity to protect their dignity ’ : A. Flanders,  Management and Unions (1970), at 
239. 
 38  Eckert,  ‘ Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 4, at 41, 47. 
 39  A. Schopenhauer,  The Basis of Morality (trans. and intro. by A.B. Bullock, 2005), Pt II, Critique of Kant’s 
Basis of Ethics. 
 40  Marx,  ‘ Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality, a Contribution to German Cultural History Contra Karl 
Heinzen ’ ,  Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung Nos 86, 87, 90, 92, and 94, 28 and 31 Oct., 11, 18, and 25 Nov. 
1847. 
 41  K. Ansell-Pearson and C. Diethe (eds),  Nietzsch: On the Genealogy of Morality ,  ‘ The Greek State ’ (1994), at 
176, 185. 
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 In light of these attacks, it is noteworthy that the Catholic Church adopted  ‘ human 
dignity ’ as the rallying cry for the social teaching it developed at the end of the 
19th century. The threat that socialism was seen as posing, particularly with the 
development of Communism by Marx and the fear of radical redistribution, class 
war, and totalitarianism, contributed to the adoption of dignity as central to an all-
encompassing Catholic social doctrine, beginning with Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical 
 Rerum Novarum at the end of the 19th century, 42 and developed further through-
out the 20th century by Pius XI. 43 This was further developed and reﬁ ned in Pope 
John XXIII’s encyclical  Pacem in Terris 44 and in a key document of the Second Vati-
can Council  Gaudium et Spes . 45 Dignity was also a signiﬁ cant feature of Pope Paul VI 
and Pope John Paul II’s writings. 46 The approach to dignity developed in this context 
emphasized the limits of rights in being able to capture the full range of what was 
necessary to human well-being, the dangers of a conﬂ ictual politics, and the need for 
solidarity between the different interests in society, resulting in a more communitar-
ian conception of human dignity. But dignity was not simply a conception of Man as 
a political and social animal, and the creation of Man in the image of God remained a 
key element in its formulation and understanding. 
 A particularly inﬂ uential exemplar of this approach was Jacques Maritain, the 
prominent French Catholic philosopher, and a well-known presence at the time of 
the drafting of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. He was active in promoting a philosophy which applied the theology of Aqui-
nas to modern conditions. Central to this philosophy, as developed by Maritain, was 
the concept of human dignity. 47 It was Maritain, above all, who made it central to his 
view not only of the nature of Man, but also of political life and human relations. For 
Maritain, dignity was a fact (a metaphysical or ontological status, as well as a moral 
entitlement), and it was he who brought it into practical international politics in the 
post-Second World War period. His position as a man of affairs as well as an academic 
enabled him to ensure that this message was heard widely in the circles that were at 
that time engaged in the construction of the post-War global architecture, not least 
the United Nations. This was a view of human rights that viewed rights not as espous-
ing radical ethical individualism but rather as essential for the promotion of the com-
mon good. 
 Since then, human dignity has played an important role in several social and politi-
cal movements of the 20th century. It has been shaped most by the reaction against 
Nazi ideology and practice before and during the Second World War, culminating in 
 42  Pope Leo XIII,  Rerum Novarum (1891). This and the documents in the following four footnotes are avail-
able at:  www.vatican.va . See also C.E. Curran,  Catholic Social Teaching, 1891 – Present (2002). 
 43  Pope Pius XI,  Quadragesimo Anno (1931). 
 44  Pope John XXIII,  Pacem in Terris (1963). 
 45  Gaudium et Spes , Vatican Council II (1965). 
 46  Pope Paul VI,  Populorum Progressio (1967); Pope John Paul II,  Centesimus Annus (1991). 
 47  E.g., J. Maritain,  Man and the State (1998). 
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the horrors of the Holocaust. It was a central organizing concept in the civil rights 
movement in the United States, and in the articulation of feminist demands concern-
ing the role of women (echoing Mary Wollstonecraft). Dignity is playing a major role in 
discussions on the ethics of biomedical research. 48 In the area of bioethics, it has been 
made a central issue in discussions of reproductive rights, in campaigns on the issue 
of appropriate treatment at the end of life, and in the issue of genetic manipulation, 
not least because of the inﬂ uence of the Catholic Church. More generally, dignity has 
increasingly passed into vernacular use in a variety of very different contexts and cir-
cumstances. 49 It has been drawn on extensively in the international political context, 
most notably in critiques of Communism, and as the moral basis for attacking global 
poverty. Nelson Mandela, in his Trafalgar Square speech in 2005, argued that  ‘ [o]ver-
coming poverty is not a gesture of charity. It is as act of justice. It is the protection of a 
fundamental human rights, the right to dignity and a decent life. ’ 50 In the Australian 
Government’s apology to the indigenous  ‘ stolen generation ’ , the Prime Minister apolo-
gized for past  ‘ indignity ’ inﬂ icted. 51 
 Not only has the use of dignity become commonplace in the context of social move-
ments, but there also appears to have been something of a resurgence of interest in the 
use and analysis of the concept of dignity among philosophers and political theorists. 52 
This article does not attempt to engage with this debate. So far, at least, there is lit-
tle evidence that the legal (and more importantly for the purposes of this article, the 
judicial) use of the concept has been directly affected by recent philosophical/political 
theory analyses, or vice versa. 
 48  See, e.g., Beyleveld and Brownsword,  ‘ Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics ’ , 61  MLR 
(1998) 661. An article by Macklin,  ‘ Dignity is a Useless Concept ’ , 327  British Medical J (2003) 1419, 
was highly critical of the use of dignity language in this context. Recently, the (US) President’s Council 
on Bioethics published a set of essays exploring this theme:  Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Com-
missioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008), available at:  www.bioethics.gov/reports/
human_dignity/index.html , which has generated some hostile commentary: see Pinker,  ‘ The Stupid-
ity of Dignity ’ ,  New Republic , 28 May 2008, available at:  www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id =d8731cf4-
e87b-4d88-b7e7-f5059cd0bfbd. 
 49  Here are a few. Vice Admiral Thad Allen, the federal ofﬁ cer in charge of recovering the dead after Hur-
ricane Katrina told a news conference:  ‘ [w]e are mindful of the dignity needed to be afforded each [of 
the dead] ’ . A report on the eviction of Kalahari Bushmen from their ancestral lands in Botswana (25 
July 2005) included an interview with a young Bushman who had been forced to live in a settlement 
outside his ancestral lands. He said,  ‘ There is nothing here for me. My land is my dignity ’ . (I am grateful 
to Michael Rosen for drawing this to my attention.) 
 50  Nelson Mandela, Trafalgar Square, 3 Feb. 2005. 
 51  See www.aph.gov.au/house/Rudd_Speech.pdf. 
 52  Here are just some examples: M. Nussbaum,  Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 
(2000); M. Nussbaum,  Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2006); R. Dwor-
kin,  Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (2008); J. Feinberg,  Social Philoso-
phy (1973); J. Grifﬁ n,  On Human Rights (2008); Gewirth,  ‘ Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights ’ , in M.J. 
Meyer and W.A. Parent (eds),  The Constitution of Rights (1992), at 10; Waldron,  ‘ Dignity and Rank ’ , 48 
 Archives européennes de sociologie (2007) 201; Lee and George,  ‘ The Nature and Basis of Dignity ’ , 21  Ratio 
Juris (2008) 173; Rosen,  supra note 10. 
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 2   Finding Human Dignity in Human Rights Texts 
 A   Human Dignity in National Constitutional Texts 
 Despite its relative prominence in the history of ideas, it was not until the ﬁ rst half of 
the 20th century, however, that dignity began to enter legal, and particularly con-
stitutional and international legal, discourse in any particularly sustained way. 53 
The use of dignity in legal texts, in the sense of referring to human dignity as inher-
ent in Man, comes in the ﬁ rst three decades of the 20th century. Several countries in 
Europe and the Americas incorporated the concept of dignity in their constitutions: 54 
in 1917 Mexico; 55 in 1919 Weimar Germany 56 and Finland; 57 in 1933 Portugal; 58 
in 1937 Ireland; 59 and in 1940 Cuba. 60 It seems clear that the combination of the 
Enlightenment, republican, socialist/social democratic, and Catholic uses of dignity 
together contributed signiﬁ cantly to these developments, with each being more or 
less inﬂ uential in different countries. So, for example, in Finland the socialist inﬂ u-
ence was clear. In the Irish context the Catholic inﬂ uence was dominant, as it was in 
Portugal 61 and Spain  – in 1945 the Basic Law of Spain included a reference to digni-
ty. 62 In the Central and South American context, the social democratic/socialist and 
Catholic inﬂ uences were both signiﬁ cantly present. 63 
 Though growing, this constitutional use of dignity remained pretty marginal, how-
ever, until the end of the Second World War. It was not surprising, perhaps, that of 
the new national constitutions which incorporated dignity between 1945 and 1950, 
three of the most prominent (Japan, Italy, and Germany) were of defeated nations 
of the Second World War responsible for a substantial part of the horrors that the 
human rights movement was aiming to eradicate. In 1946 Japan, 64 in 1948 Italy, 65 
and in 1949 West Germany 66 incorporated dignity in the constitutional documents. 
 53  But see Decree of 27 Apr. 1848 of the French Republic abolishing slavery in all French colonies and pos-
sessions, referring to slavery as an  ‘ affront to human dignity ’ . 
 54  Iglesias,  ‘ Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual ’ , 4  Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and 
Culture (2001) 114. 
 55  Art. 3c. 
 56  Reich Constitution of 11 Aug. 1919, Art. 151. 
 57  Pt I; General Provisions. 
 58  Constitution of Portugal, 1933, Art. 45. 
 59  Preamble. 
 60  Art. 32. 
 61  ‘ Salazar used Quadragesimo Anno as a blueprint for his government ’ , in Manuel and Mott,  ‘ Une Messe 
est Possible ’ : The Imbroglio of the Catholic Church in Contemporary Latin Europe (CES Working Papers, Series 
No. 133 (2004)), at 10, available at: www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/ManuelMott.pdf 
 62  ‘ The Spanish State proclaims as a guiding principle of its acts, respect for the dignity, integrity and free-
dom of the human person  … . ’ 
 63  Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, 1949, Arts 33 and 56. 
 64  Art. 24. 
 65  The Constitution of the Italian Republic, 1948, Arts 3, 27, and 41. 
 66  Chap. 1, Art. 1(1). 
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The movement to incorporate dignity into new constitutions was, however, by no 
means conﬁ ned to European and Latin American states. When Israel declared inde-
pendence in 1948, the Declaration of Independence referred to how  ‘ [s]urvivors of the 
Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to 
migrate to  Eretz-Israel , undaunted by difﬁ culties, restrictions and dangers, and never 
ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national 
homeland ’ . 67 In 1950 the Constitution of India did likewise. 68 In his 1950 assessment 
of post-War constitutionalism, Carl Friedrich identiﬁ ed  ‘ the stress laid upon the dig-
nity of man ’ as its core value. 69 
 Of these national constitutional references to dignity, we shall see subsequently 
that much the most inﬂ uential was the incorporation of dignity into the West German 
constitution. The inﬂ uence of Catholic, social democratic, and Kantian thinking on 
the drafting of that constitution is well known, and dignity has the most prominent 
place of all in the Basic Law which emerged in 1949. 70 The debate over the drafting 
of the provision was intense, focusing on whether the dignity of the human person 
should be based explicitly on natural law. The ﬁ nal text, however, avoided any refer-
ence to  ‘ a speciﬁ c philosophical or ethical concept of human dignity and remains open 
to different approaches ’ , 71 providing (in English translation)  ‘ [t]he dignity of man is 
inviolable. To respect and to protect it shall be the duty of all public authority. ’ 72 
 B   Dignity in Previous International and Regional Human Rights Texts 
and Proposals 
 Dignity had also been incorporated in several drafts of earlier proposals for an interna-
tional Bill of Rights. Even before the Second World War, the Dijon Declaration of 1936 
referred to  ‘ respect for human dignity and civilised behaviour ’ . 73 The American Jewish 
Committee’s Declaration of Human Rights (1944) had provided:  ‘ [a]ll that we cherish 
must rest on the dignity and inviolability of the person, of his sacred right to live and 
to develop under God, in whose image he was created ’ . 74 Unsurprisingly, the Catholic 
Bishops in the United States in 1946 had included  ‘ dignity ’ in the text of their pro-
posed Declaration of Rights. The term had also been proposed by the Uruguayan Gov-
ernment in its detailed suggestions for what should be included in the United Nations 
 67  The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948. 
 68  Preamble. 
 69  Freidrich,  ‘ The Political Theory of the New Democratic Constitutions ’ , 12  Rev of Politics (1950) 215, at 
217. 
 70  See Andries,  ‘ On the German Constitution’s Fifthieth Anniversary: Jacques Maritain and the 1949 Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz) ’ , 13  Emory Int’l L Rev (1999) 1. 
 71  Walter,  ‘ Human Dignity in German Constitutional Law ’ , in European Commission for Democracy 
through Law,  supra note 14, at 24, 26. 
 72  Grundgesetz, Art. 1(1). 
 73  The Dijon Declaration, 1936, translated in H.G. Wells,  The Rights of Man or What Are We Fighting For? 
(1940). I am grateful to Brian Simpson for providing many of the references in the following para. 
 74  Cited in Dicke,  ‘ The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ’ , 
in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 4, at 111, 113. 
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Charter. The Cuban Declaration of Human Rights of 1946 included that every human 
being had the  ‘ right to life, to liberty, to personal security and to respect for his dig-
nity as a human being ’ . 75 Georges Gurvitch’s Bill of Social Rights of 1946 referred to 
the need for society to protect  ‘ liberty and human dignity ’ . 76 The American Federa-
tion of Labor’s Preamble to its international Bill of Rights proposal in 1946 stipulated 
that the  ‘ dynamic motive of a truly democratic society is to foster and enhance the 
worth and dignity of the individual human being  … ’ , and provided in Article 1: 
 ‘ [e]very human being  – irrespective of race, colour, creed, sex or national origin  – has 
the right to pursue his or her work and spiritual development in conditions of free-
dom and dignity ’ . 77 Even the United Kingdom’s International Bill of Rights of 1947 
included in the Preamble a reference to  ‘ fundamental human rights and  … the dignity 
and worth of the human person ’ . 78 The United States proposals for a human rights 
convention in 1947 provided that  ‘ [i]t shall be unlawful to subject any person to tor-
ture, or to cruel or inhuman punishment, or to cruel or inhuman indignity ’ . 79 
 At the regional level, dignity was included in the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, the ﬁ rst international human rights instrument of a gen-
eral nature, predating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by more 
than six months. 80 The Preamble provided:  ‘ [a]ll men are born free and equal, in dig-
nity and in rights, and, being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they 
should conduct themselves as brothers one to another ’ . The ﬁ rst chapter established a 
catalogue of rights, whilst the second chapter contained a list of corresponding duties. 
Dignity played an important role in both. As explained in the preamble,  ‘ [t]he fulﬁ ll-
ment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties 
are interrelated in every social and political activity of man. While rights exalt indi-
vidual liberty, duties express the dignity of that liberty. ’ The treaty establishing the 
Organization of American States referred in chapter VII to the importance of dignity 
as a basis for social legislation. The text of the Bill of Rights of the European Movement 
of May 1948, by which time the UN draft declaration of human rights was available, 
provided in Article 1:  ‘ [a]ll men are born free and equal in dignity ’ , 81 and in Article 
29 that  ‘ every one has a right that his dignity and health shall be preserved through 
the provision of a diet, of clothing, of housing and of medical requirements up to a 
standard corresponding to the resources of the European Union in relation to vital 
necessities ’ . 
 75  E/HR/1, 22 Apr. 1946. Original in Spanish. 
 76  G. Gurvitch,  The Bill of Social Rights (1946), at Art. 1. 
 77  American Federation of Labor, E/CT.2/2, 20 Aug. 1946. 
 78  United Nations,  Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947 (1949), at 488. 
 79  US Proposals for a Human Rights Convention (Nov. 1947), E/CN.4/37. 
 80  It was adopted by the nations of the Americas at the Ninth International Conference of American States 
in Bogotá, Colombia, in Apr. 1948, the same meeting that adopted the Charter of the Organization of 
American States and thereby created the OAS. 
 81  Text of Bill of Rights of European Movement, 4 May 1948. 
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 C   Human Dignity in the UN Charter and the UDHR 
 Much of the inspiration for the subsequent use of dignity in international and regional 
human rights texts derives from the use of dignity in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The Preamble mentions dignity in two places:  ‘ [w]hereas recognition 
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world  … ’ , and a 
little later:  ‘ [w]hereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reafﬁ rmed 
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedoms  … ’ . Article 1 takes up 
this theme and provides:  ‘ [a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood. ’ There are also several more speciﬁ c uses of dig-
nity in the remainder of the text. Article 22, on the right to social security, provides: 
 ‘ [e]veryone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality ’ . Arti-
cle 23(3), set in the context of right to work, provides that  ‘ [e]veryone who works has 
the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an 
existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means 
of social protection ’ . 
 D   Human Dignity in International Humanitarian Law Texts 
 Apart from some scattered references during the 19th century to dignity in 
national provisions relating to the treatment of prisoners, 82 and in a draft treaty provi-
sion prior to the Second World War relating to the treatment of civilian populations, 83 
the major boost in international humanitarian law to the use of dignity also came 
after the Second World War in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions. The impor-
tance of dignity as the basis for the approach adopted was clear from the outset. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross proposed to the Powers assembled in Geneva 
the text of a Preamble, which was to be identical in each of the four Conventions: 
 ‘ [r]espect for the personality and dignity of human beings constitutes a universal prin-
ciple which is binding even in the absence of any contractual undertaking. Such a 
principle demands that, in time of war, all those not actively engaged in the hostilities 
and all those placed  “ hors de combat ” by reason of sickness, wounds, capture, or any 
other circumstance, shall be given due respect and have protection from the effects of 
war, and that those among them who are in suffering shall be succored and tended 
 82  ‘ Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field ’ (Lieber Code), 24 Apr. 1863, 
Art. 75. 
 83  First draft Convention adopted in Monaco (Sanitary cities and localities), 27 July 1934, Art. 3. 
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without distinction of race, nationality, religious belief, political opinion or any other 
quality  … ’ . 84 The text of the Conventions, as adopted, incorporated  ‘ dignity ’ most 
prominently in Common Article 3, which prohibits  inter alia  ‘ outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment ’ . 85 Such acts  ‘ are and shall 
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever ’ with respect to persons 
protected by the Conventions. 
 Subsequently, Additional Protocol I to the Conventions relating to the protection of 
victims of international armed conﬂ icts prohibited  ‘ outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form 
of indecent assault ’ in Article 75 (relating to  ‘ fundamental guarantees ’ ). 86 Article 85 
provided that certain acts  ‘ shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when 
committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol ’ including  ‘ (c) 
practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages 
upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination ’ . 87 Article 4 of the Second Addi-
tional Protocol prohibited  ‘ (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliat-
ing and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent 
assault ’ . 88 Since then, the statutes of  ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the 
Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court have incorporated similar 
references to  ‘ outrages upon personal dignity ’ . 89 
 E   Dignity and International Human Rights Texts after the 1940s 
 Since the relatively dramatic increase in the use of dignity in the international human 
rights law context during the 1940s, dignity has become commonplace in new inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law instruments. At the international level, 
dignity is now routinely incorporated in human rights charters, both general and 
speciﬁ c. Unsurprisingly, given the role that dignity played in abolitionist politics, the 
preamble to the Slavery Convention of 1956 refers to the UN Charter’s reafﬁ rmation 
 84  See  ‘ Remarks and Proposals submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross ’ , Document for 
the consideration of Governments invited by the Swiss Federal Council to attend the Diplomatic Confer-
ence of Geneva (21 Apr. 1949) (Feb. 1949), at 8. 
 85  Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949, Art. 3. 
 86  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conﬂ icts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
 87  Ibid . 
 88  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Non-International Armed Conﬂ icts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
 89  See, e.g., the Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 Jan. 2002, Art. 3, pro-
hibiting  ‘ [o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, en-
forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault ’ ; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide 
and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 Jan. 1994 and 31 
Dec. 1994, Art. 4; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Art. 8, prohibiting 
 ‘ outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment ’ . 
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of the Member’s  ‘ faith in the dignity and worth of the human person ’ . 90 So too, unsur-
prisingly given the importance attached to the  ‘ dignity of labour ’ in the growth of the 
trade union movement, dignity is referred to, periodically, in the Preambles to several 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions, although without any appar-
ent explanatory pattern being perceptible. 91 Three of the core international human 
rights conventions concluded during the 1960s conﬁ rmed that dignity would con-
tinue to play a signiﬁ cant role in human rights texts. The International Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights, on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination all included dignity language both in their Pre-
ambles 92 and in the texts of several Articles, those relating to the treatment of those 
subject to a deprivation of their liberty through imprisonment or detention, 93 and the 
right to education. 94 This pattern of including references to dignity in the Preambles 
to major international human rights texts has continued since then and is reﬂ ected 
in the Preambles to the International Conventions regarding Discrimination against 
Women (1979) 95 and the Prevention of Torture (1984). 96 
 By 1986, dignity had become so central to United Nations ’ conceptions of human 
rights that the UN General Assembly provided, in its guidelines for new human rights 
instruments, that such instruments should be  ‘ of fundamental character and derive 
from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person ’ . 97 Since then, not surpris-
ingly, the major conventions on the Rights of Children (1989), 98 the Rights of Migrant 
Workers (1990), 99 Protection against Forced Disappearance, 100 and the Rights of Disa-
bled Persons (2007) 101 have all included references to dignity, asserting the centrality 
 90  Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and practices 
Similar to Slavery 1956, 226 UNTS 3, Preamble. 
 91  C156 Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981; C122 Employment Policy Convention, 
1964; C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958; C107 Indigenous and 
Tribal Populations Convention, 1957; C104 (Shelved) Abolition of Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Work-
ers) Convention, 1955. 
 92  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination GA Res 2106 (XX), 
Annex, 20 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, UN Doc A/6014 (1966), 660 UNTS 195, Preamble; ICESCR, 
 supra note 5, Preamble; ICCPR,  supra note 5, Preamble. 
 93  Ibid., Art. 10. 
 94  ICESCR,  supra note 5, Art. 13. 
 95  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, GA Res 34/180, 34 UN 
GAOR Supp (No. 46), at 193, UN Doc A/34/46, Preamble. 
 96  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res 
39/46, annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp (No. 51), at 197, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984), Preamble. 
 97  GA Res. 41/120, 4 Dec. 1986, quoted in A. Clapham,  Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(2006), at 538. 
 98  Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp (No 49), at 167, UN Doc 
A/44/49 (1989), Preamble. 
 99  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, GA Res 45/158, annex, 45 UN GAOR Supp (No. 49A), at 262, UN Doc A/45/49 (1990), Arts 
17 and 70. 
 100  International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, E/CN 4/2005/
WG 22/WP 1/Rev 4 (2005), Art. 19. 
 101  International Convention on the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res A/61/611 
(2006), Preamble, Arts 3, 8, 16, 24, and 25. 
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of dignity to human rights in general and (often) its centrality to speciﬁ c rights in play 
in that convention. But, in addition, international instruments in other more speciﬁ c 
spheres as far apart as those dealing with the right to food 102 and the death penalty 103 
have also adopted dignity language in their preambles. 
 A further major ﬁ llip to the use of dignity in the international sphere was given by 
the adoption of dignity as the central organizing principle of the Vienna World Confer-
ence on Human Rights in 1993. The Declaration and Programme of Action adopted 
dignity as foundational not just to human rights in general, 104 but also adopted the 
concept of dignity in their provisions dealing with particular areas of human rights, 
such as the treatment of indigenous peoples, 105 the prohibition of torture, 106 the prohi-
bition of gender-based violence and harassment, 107 the abolition of extreme poverty, 108 
and the issue of biomedical ethics. 109 Increasingly, the role of dignity has expanded 
beyond the preambles to international human rights documents and into the texts 
of their substantive articles. References to dignity have expanded to include not only 
rights relating to conditions of (and treatment during) detention 110 and the right to 
education, 111 but also other rights: rights in the criminal justice process, 112 rights to 
be provided minimum conditions of welfare, 113 the right to health, 114 the right of disa-
bled persons to be treated as autonomous individuals, 115 the right of children to be 
treated with dignity following abuse, 116 rights to reputation, 117 rights of indigenous 
 102  The Preamble to the Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development of 
1977, TIAS 8765, 1059 UNTS 191, recognizes  ‘ that the continuing food problem of the world is afﬂ ict-
ing a large segment of the people of the developing countries and is jeopardizing the most fundamental 
principles and values associated with the right to life and human dignity ’ . 
 103  Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, GA Res 44/128, 
annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp (No. 49), at 207, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), Preamble. 
 104  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 – 25 
June 1993, UN Doc A/CONF 157/24 (Pt 1), at 20 (1993), Preamble. 
 105  Ibid. , Art. 20. 
 106  Ibid. , Art. 55. 
 107  Ibid. , Art. 18. 
 108  Ibid. , Art. 25. 
 109  Ibid. , Art. 11. 
 110  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families,  supra note 99, Art. 17. 
 111  Convention on the Rights of the Child,  supra note 98, Art. 28; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,  supra note 101, Art. 24. 
 112  Convention on the Rights of the Child,  supra note 98, Arts 37 and Art. 40. 
 113  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families,  supra note 99, Art. 70. 
 114  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,  supra note 101, Art. 25. 
 115  Ibid. , Art. 16. 
 116  Convention on the Rights of the Child,  supra note 98, Art. 39; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,  supra note 101, Art. 3; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Arts 1 and 3. 
 117  Ibid., Art. 8; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
 supra note 100, Art. 24; Convention on the Rights of the Child,  supra note 98, Art. 23. 
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cultures, 118 rights to control access and use of personal data, 119 and the conduct of 
biomedical experimentation. 120 
 F   Dignity in Regional Texts 
 The use of dignity is not restricted to the sphere of international human and humani-
tarian rights texts. Increasingly, dignity language has become embedded in the texts 
of regional human rights instruments. Dignity is central to the Preambles to the prin-
cipal Inter-American, 121 Arab, 122 African, 123 and (some) European 124 human rights 
instruments, thus appearing to demonstrate a remarkable degree of convergence on 
dignity as a central organizing principle. Although it was not included in the text of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 125 it is included prominently in sev-
eral later Council of Europe conventions, notably the Revised European Social Char-
ter 126 and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. 127 The aim of the latter 
Convention is to protect the dignity and identity of human beings and to guarantee 
everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fun-
damental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine. It protects 
the dignity of everyone, including the unborn, and its main concern is to ensure that 
no research or intervention may be carried out that would undermine respect for the 
 118  C107 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957,  supra note 91, Art. 2; UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Adopted by GA Res 61/295 on 13 Sept. 2007, Arts 15 and 43. 
 119  C185 Seafarers ’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003, at para. 8; International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,  supra note 100, Art. 19. 
 120  The UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997, UN GA Res 
AIRES/53/152, 9 Dec. 1998, gave a central role to the idea of human dignity: Preamble, Arts 1, 2, 6, 10, 
11, 12, 15, 21, and 24. 
 121  Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women 
 ‘ Convention of Belem do Para ’ , 33 ILM (1994) 1534, Preamble; Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture, OAS Treaty Series No. 67, 25 ILM (1992) 519, Preamble; American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX (1948), American Convention on Human Rights, OAS 
Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123, Preamble, Arts 6 and 11. 
 122  League of Arab States, Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 2004, 12  Int’l Human Rights 
Rep (2005) 893:  ‘ [b]ased on the faith of the Arab nation in the dignity of the human person whom God 
has exalted ever since the beginning of creation and in the fact that the Arab homeland is the cradle of 
religions and civilizations whose lofty human values afﬁ rm the human right to a decent life based on 
freedom, justice and equality  … ’ . 
 123  Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
2000, reprinted in 1  African Human Rights LJ (2001) 40, Art. 3; African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ 
Rights, 1981, 21 ILM (1982) 58, Preamble; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples ’ Rights, 1998, OAU Doc OAU/
LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT/III, Preamble. 
 124  Protocol 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
Council of Europe, CETS No. 184, Preamble. 
 125  ECHR, 213 UNTS 222. 
 126  European Social Charter (Revised), ETS No. 163 (1996), Preamble, Art. 26. 
 127  Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, CETS No. 164 (1997), Preamble, Art. 1. 
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dignity and identity of the human being. Finally, it is not surprising that dignity also 
features prominently in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. 128 
 So too, the use of dignity in the context of speciﬁ c textual provisions of the conven-
tions shows a remarkable degree of consistency between the regional human rights 
instruments, and between these instruments and the international instruments we 
have examined in the previous section. Thus we ﬁ nd dignity used in the context of spe-
ciﬁ c provisions dealing with slavery and forced labour, 129 persons with disabilities, 130 
treatment of children, 131 harassment, 132 treatment of those incarcerated, 133 freedom 
from torture, 134 education, 135 forced disappearances, 136 violence against women, 137 
and biomedical research. 138 
 G   Dignity in Domestic Constitutional Texts More Recently 
 Clearly one of the inﬂ uential sources for the subsequent incorporation of human dig-
nity into national constitutions was the inﬂ uence of these international and regional 
 128  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), OJ (2000) C 364/1, Preamble, 
Arts 1, 25, and 31. 
 129  African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights,  supra note 123, Art. 5; American Convention on Human 
Rights,  supra note 121, Art. 6. 
 130  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), Art. 13; 
Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, reprinted in 12  Int’l Human Rights Rep (2005) 893, Art. 40. 
 131  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,  supra note 130, Arts 20 and 21; Revised Arab 
Charter on Human Rights,  supra note 130, Arts 17 and 33. 
 132  The European Community’s prohibition of sexual harassment is essentially based on the need to promote 
the dignity of the individual in the workplace. Council Dir 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implement-
ing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ (2000) L 
180/22, Art. 3; Council Dir 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ (2001) L 303/16, Art. 3; Dir 2006/54/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal op-
portunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), 
OJ (2006) L 204/23, Art. 2; Council Dir 2004/113/EC of 13 Dec. 2004 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ (2004) 
L 373/37, Art. 2. See Friedman and Whitman,  ‘ The European Transformation of Harassment Law: Dis-
crimination Versus Dignity ’ , 9  Columbia J European L (2003) 241. 
 133  American Convention on Human Rights,  supra note 121, Art. 5; African Charter on the Rights and Wel-
fare of the Child,  supra note 130, Art. 17; Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights,  supra note 130, Art. 
20. 
 134  Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 1990, UN GAOR, World Conference on Human Rights, 4th 
Sess., Agenda Item 5, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993), Art. 20. 
 135  Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988), Art. 13; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child,  supra note 130, Art. 11. 
 136  Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 33 ILM (1994) 1429, Preamble. 
 137  Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women,  supra note 121, Arts 4 and 8. 
 138  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Ap-
plication of Biology and Medicines: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Council of Europe 
CETS No 164 (1997), Preamble, Art. 1; Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine concerning Biomedical Research, Council of Europe CETS No 195 (2004), Preamble, Art. 1. 
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texts. The incorporation of dignity into the Charter and the Universal Declaration 
thus took place at the same time as human dignity was being incorporated into other 
regional human rights instruments and national constitutions. There appears to have 
been an injection of the concept of dignity throughout the world at that time. Identify-
ing which particular document inﬂ uenced which other document is thus a somewhat 
pointless enterprise as the concept was so much in the political ether, as it were, that 
it tended to crop up all over the place. The impulse to incorporate dignity was clearly 
strongest in those circles which were inﬂ uenced by Catholic or socialist thinking, and 
probably most strongly in those circles where both inﬂ uences were present. 
 As regards constitutional rights at the domestic level in Europe, there have been two 
periods when dignity language came to the fore since the 1940s. In the 1970s, with 
the fall of the dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, dignity was incorporated 
into the new democratic constitutions. 139 The most dramatic increase came in the 
1990s following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the transition to democracy in cen-
tral and eastern Europe. The desire to draft new national constitutions and the incor-
poration of human rights in these documents led to discussions on which existing 
constitutions might be a suitable model. Frequently, the German constitution and 
its interpretation by the German Constitutional Court was a prime inﬂ uence in the 
drafting of these constitutions generally, explaining the extent to which dignity also 
became incorporated in these new instruments. 140 The German inﬂ uence extended 
beyond central and eastern Europe, however, playing a major role in the drafting of 
the new South African constitution post-apartheid, bringing with it a central place for 
dignity. 141 The German inﬂ uence is also apparent in the drafting of Israel’s Basic Law 
on Human Dignity, which was to serve as the basis for a Bill of Rights. 142 
 H   Differences in Dignity in Human Rights Texts 
 However, as might be expected from the variety of differing approaches that are appar-
ent in the historical development of the idea of dignity, there are some signiﬁ cant 
differences in the use of dignity in human rights texts. A more pluralistic, more cultur-
ally relative approach to the meaning of human dignity can be identiﬁ ed by looking 
brieﬂ y at some of the differences in the use of dignity language between the regional 
 139  Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, 9 June 1975, Art. 7; Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain, 27 Dec. 
1978, Art. 10; Constitution of the Portugese Republic, 2 Apr. 1976, Arts, 1, 26, and 59. 
 140  Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Act XX of 1949, as amended, Art. 54; Constitution of the Czech 
Republic (Constitution Act No. 1/1993 of 16 Dec. 1992), Preamble; Charter of fundamental rights and 
basic freedoms (Resolution of the Presidium of the Czech National Council of 16 Dec. 1992, Act No. 
2/1992); Constitution of Estonia, 28 June 1992, Art. 10; Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 25 
Oct. 1992, Art. 21; Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 2 Apr. 1997, Preamble, Arts 30 and 41; Con-
stitution of the Republic of Slovakia, 23 Dec. 1991, Arts 21 and 34; Constitution of the Slovak Republic, 
1 Sept. 1992, Arts 12 and 19. 
 141  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (108 of 1996), ss 1, 7, 10, 35, 36, 39, 165, 181, 196, and 
Sched 2. 
 142  (Israel) Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (17 Mar. 1992, amended 9 Mar. 1994). 
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texts, and between the regional texts and the international texts. There are signiﬁ cant 
differences relating to the extent to which dignity should be regarded as related to 
national liberation and self-determination, 143 as an appropriate limit on freedom of 
speech, 144 as grounding a basis for protecting honour and reputation, 145 as grounding 
individual duties to the community as well as rights, 146 as requiring the provision of 
socio-economic rights in general (or particular socio-economic rights such as work-
place rights, or the right to property), 147 as related to the role of dignity in the context 
of rights of women, 148 and as relevant to freedom of religion. 149 
 143  Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights,  supra note 122, Art. 2(3):  ‘ [a]ll forms of racism, Zionism and 
foreign occupation and domination constitute an impediment to human dignity and a major barrier to 
the exercise of the fundamental rights of peoples; all such practices must be condemned and efforts must 
be deployed for their elimination ’ . See also African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights,  supra note 
123, Preamble. 
 144  Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,  supra note 134, Art. 22:  ‘  … Information is a vital necessity to 
society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Proph-
ets, undermine moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. ’ 
 145  American Convention on Human Rights,  supra note 121, Art. 11(1):  ‘ [e]veryone has the right to have his 
honour respected and his dignity recognized ’ . 
 146  The Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States (Protocol of Buenos 
Aires), OAS Treaty Series No. 1-A, provides in Art. 43(a), that  ‘ [a]ll human beings, without distinction 
as to race, sex, nationality, creed, or social condition, have a right to material well-being and to their 
spiritual development, under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic 
security ’ . Art. 43(b) provides,  ‘ [w]ork is a right and a social duty, it gives dignity to the one who per-
forms it  … ’ . The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,  supra note 121, Preamble, states: 
 ‘ [t]he fulﬁ llment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties are inter-
related in every social and political activity of man. While rights exalt individual liberty, duties express 
the dignity of that liberty. ’ 
 147  Ibid. , Art. 23:  ‘ [e]very person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of de-
cent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home ’ ; European Social Charter 
(revised),  supra note 126, Art. 26 states:  ‘ [w]ith a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of all 
workers to protection of their dignity at work, the Parties undertake, in consultation with employers ’ and 
workers ’ organisations: 1. to promote  … prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace or in relation 
to work and to take all appropriate measures to protect workers from such conduct ’ . The Preamble to  ibid. 
states:  ‘ The Parties accept as the aim of their policy, to be pursued by all appropriate means both national 
and international in character, the attainment of conditions in which the following rights and principles 
may be effectively realized  … 26. All workers have the right to dignity at work. ’ See also Additional Pro-
tocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
OAS Treaty Series No. 69 (1998), Preamble. 
 148  Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,  supra note 134, Art. 6(a):  ‘ [w]oman is equal to man in hu-
man dignity, and has her own rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform, and has her own civil entity 
and ﬁ nancial independence, and the right to retain her name and lineage. (b) The husband is responsi-
ble for the maintenance and welfare of the family. ’ The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights,  supra 
note 130, Art. 3(3), states:  ‘ [m]en and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and obliga-
tions within the framework of the positive discrimination established in favour of women by the Islamic 
Shariah, other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments. Accordingly, each State party 
pledges to take all the requisite measures to guarantee equal opportunities and effective equality between 
men and women in the enjoyment of all the rights set out in this Charter. ’ 
 149  Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,  supra note 134, Art.1(a):  ‘ [a]ll human beings form one fam-
ily whose members are united by their subordination to Allah and descent from Adam. All men are equal 
in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on 
the basis of race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political afﬁ liation, social status or other considera-
tions. The true religion is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human integrity. ’ 
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 What emerges from these differences is that some jurisdictions use dignity as the 
basis for (or another way of expressing) a comprehensive moral viewpoint,  ‘ a whole 
moral world view ’ , which seems distinctly different from region to region. 150 In this 
sense, to speak of human dignity is a shorthand way of summing up how a complex, 
multi-faceted set of relationships involving Man is, or should be, governed: relation-
ships between man and man, man and God, man and animals, man and the natural 
environment, man and the universe. The classic examples of this use of dignity are 
to be found in Catholic and Islamic doctrine. Legally, this use can be seen in some of 
the more general references to dignity in several constitutional texts, most notably 
those the drafting of which was most inﬂ uenced by Catholic social teaching in the 
1920s and 1930s, such as Ireland’s 1937 Constitution 151 and the human rights texts 
emerging from the Arab world. 152 What also emerges from an analysis of these texts 
is signiﬁ cant differences in the ways in which human dignity has been incorporated 
into positive law. In many of the instruments, dignity is to be found in the preamble, 
whereas in others it is used to explicate particular rights. In some it is referred to as 
foundational in some sense; in others not. In some, human dignity is a right in itself 
(and in some systems, a particularly privileged right), whilst, in other jurisdictions, it 
is not a right but a general principle. 
 3   Finding an Overlapping Consensus: A Minimum Core of 
Human Dignity? 
 We need, at this point, to step back from the detail. It is clear that the idea of dig-
nity has become a central organizing principle in the idea of universal human rights, 
although with interesting differences between jurisdictions, and that there are several 
different strands of metaphysical and philosophical thinking feeding these differences. 
Despite these differences, can we identify a common core to the idea of dignity? 
 A   Dignity as Placeholder in the UDHR and Other Human Rights Texts? 
 We can attempt to answer this question in several ways. At this point, a brief excursus 
into the drafting history of the UN Charter and the UDHR will be useful. Central to the 
development of dignity in the UDHR was the earlier incorporation of the concept of 
dignity in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. It would be most satisfac-
tory to be able to tell a nicely researched story of how the term came to be included in 
the UN Charter but it is shrouded in some mystery, and we can only speculate as to 
 150  Shultziner,  ‘ Human Dignity  – Function and Meanings ’ , 3(3)  Global Jurist Topics (2003) 5, at fn. 24. 
 151  Bunreacht Na hÉireann (1937), Preamble:  ‘ [i]n the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all 
authority and to Whom, as our ﬁ nal end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,  … Humbly 
acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ  … And seeking to promote the com-
mon good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the 
individual may be assured  … ’ 
 152  See,  supra notes 122, 130, and 134. 
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the precise source of the proposal. What is clear is that the originator of much of the 
Preamble was Jan Christian Smuts, the South African general and former member of 
the British War Cabinet. It was his draft which formed the basis for the Preamble, and 
incorporated the important reference to human rights as a foundational principle of 
the new United Nations. However, his draft did not include a reference explicitly to 
human dignity. 153 That phrase appeared only after a further committee discussion, 
and I have been unable to identify precisely from where it originated. 154 
 All that can be said, without further evidence, is that the phrase was by then in 
such common use in the circles devising the new United Nations global architecture 
that it was unsurprising that it emerged from the drafting Committee. The Interna-
tional Labour Organization had already incorporated the language of dignity as early 
as 1944 in the Philadelphia Declaration, which effectively re-established the aims and 
purposes of the ILO, originally established in 1919 in the Versailles Treaty. 155 Part 
II of the Declaration brought the concept of dignity to centre stage:  ‘ [b]elieving that 
experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in the Constitution of 
the International Labour Organisation that lasting peace can be established only if it 
is based on social justice, the Conference afﬁ rms that:  (a) all human beings, irrespec-
tive of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and 
their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security 
and equal opportunity  … ’ . 156 A few months after the incorporation of  ‘ dignity ’ in the 
Charter, it also played a prominent role in the Preamble to the treaty establishing the 
United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁ c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 157 
 In contrast to the dearth of information on the inclusion of dignity in the Preamble 
to the United Nations Charter, we can be somewhat clearer on how the term  ‘ human 
dignity ’ came to be included in the UDHR. 158 There has long been a debate over 
the relative importance of René Cassin and John Humphrey in the drafting of the 
Declaration. 159 The better view, according to the most thorough scholarly literature, is 
that Humphrey was considerably more important than he has sometimes been given 
credit for, producing (effectively) the ﬁ rst draft of the Declaration. Whilst that is no 
doubt true, the incorporation of the concept of dignity in the text of the Declaration 
 153  R.B. Russell,  A History of the United Nations Charter (1958), at 911 – 913, although it did refer to  ‘ the 
sanctity and ultimate value of human personality  … ’ . See also Marshall,  ‘ Smuts and the Preamble to the 
UN Charter ’ , 358  The Round Table (2001) 55. 
 154  Russell,  supra note 153, at 916. Smuts ’ original phrase was changed to  ‘ the dignity and value of the hu-
man person ’ . Mary Ann Glendon reports Charles Malik, a prominent member of the UN Human Rights 
Commission at the time, as saying that the term had been inserted at the suggestion of Smuts: M.A. Glen-
don,  A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2001), at 144. 
 155  Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation (Declaration of 
Philadelphia), May 1944. 
 156  Ibid. , II. 
 157  Constitution of the UN Educational, Scientiﬁ c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), adopted in London 
on 16 Nov. 1945, 3 Bevans 1311. 
 158  The detailed drafting history is set out in the United Nations,  supra note 78, Annex, at 484 ff. 
 159  See J. Morsink,  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (2000). 
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was due not to Humphrey but to Cassin. Humphrey’s ﬁ rst draft did not include any 
reference to dignity, and it was included ﬁ rst by Cassin when he redrafted Humphrey’s 
draft. The inclusion of dignity in the Declaration obviously drew on its inclusion 
already in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, of course, but it nevertheless 
was controversial. Humphrey himself, for example, clearly considered that the reference 
to dignity did not add anything at all to his draft and that its incorporation as Article 1 of 
the Declaration was mere rhetoric. 160 For others, however, it was a vital attempt to articu-
late their understanding of the basis on which human rights could be said to exist. Mary 
Ann Glendon recalls how, when the South African representative questioned the use 
of the term, Eleanor Roosevelt argued that it was included  ‘ in order to emphasize that 
every human being is worthy of respect  … it was meant to explain why human beings 
have rights to begin with ’ . 161 As we have seen, it was included in the ﬁ nal Declaration 
in ﬁ ve different places, twice in the Preamble, most prominently in Article 1, and twice 
in those articles setting out socio-economic rights (Articles 22 and 23). 
 Moving beyond the drafting history and thinking more broadly, we can see that the 
signiﬁ cance of human dignity, at the time of the drafting of the UN Charter and the 
UDHR (and since then in the drafting of other human rights instruments), was that 
it supplied a theoretical basis for the human rights movement in the absence of any 
other basis for consensus. We need to remember the global context in which the UDHR 
was being negotiated. To achieve a successful outcome, it was necessary to persuade 
states of vastly different ideological hue that the Declaration was consistent with their 
conceptions of human rights. What would a theory of human rights have to consist 
of for it to be a successful theory in this context? It would need, probably, to be one (i) 
that gives a coherence to the concept of human rights so that the whole is greater than 
simply the sum of its parts, and not just a ragbag collection of separate unconnected 
rights, (ii) that is not rooted in any particular region of the globe and appeals across 
cultures, but is sensitive to difference, (iii) that places importance on the person rather 
than the attributes of any particular person, but that also places the individual within 
a social dimension, (iv) that is not dependent on human rights originating only from 
the exercise of state authority (not least because what the state gives the state can also 
take away), (v) that is non-ideological (in the sense that it transcends any particular 
conﬂ icts, such as between capitalism and communism), (vi) that is humanistic (in the 
sense that it was not based on any particular set of religious principles or beliefs but 
is nevertheless consistent with them), and (vii) that is both timeless, in the sense that 
it embodies basic values that are not subject to change, and adaptable to changing 
ideas of what being human involves. 162 Such a theory has long been the Holy Grail of 
human rights. 
 At the time of the drafting of the Charter and the Universal Declaration, there was 
no shortage of theories seeking to support human rights, but none by themselves 
 160  J.P. Humphrey,  Human Rights and the United Nations: a Great Adventure (1984), at 44. 
 161  Glendon,  supra note 154, at 146. 
 162  Weisstub,  ‘ Honor, Dignity, and the Framing of Multiculturalist Values ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 
4, at 263. 
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would satisfy the need to have sufﬁ cient consensus in order to move forward. 163 A sig-
niﬁ cant role in trying to achieve an intellectual and ideological consensus on the basis 
for human rights was given by UNESCO to the philosopher, Jacques Maritain, whose 
own political philosophy (as we have seen) was strongly based on Catholic social 
teaching, according dignity a central role. Maritain’s strategy, however, was not to 
attempt to get agreement on anything as divisive as a theoretical basis for human 
rights. 164 He advised that in order to get agreement on any international declaration 
of human rights, those negotiating it should concentrate on what particular practices 
they could agree were necessary or should be prohibited. They should agree, for exam-
ple, that torture should be prohibited but should put to one side any consideration of 
why torture was wrong. To go further than simply agree on the prohibition of the 
practice was to court interminable delays and ultimate failure. 
 Those drafting the Charter and the Universal Declaration largely adopted this strat-
egy. A theory of human rights was a necessary starting point for the enterprise that was 
being embarked upon. Dignity was included in that part of any discussion or text where 
the absence of a theory of human rights would have been embarrassing. Its utility was 
to enable those participating in the debate to insert their own theory. Everyone could 
agree that human dignity was central, but not why or how. As Doron Shultziner puts 
it,  ‘ [t]here is a major advantage to this approach, for the abstention from a philosophi-
cal decision regarding the source and cause for rights and duties paves the way for a 
political consent concerning the speciﬁ c rights and duties that ought to be legislated and 
enforced in practice without waiving or compromising basic principles of belief. Thus, 
the different parties that take part in a constitutive act can conceive human dignity as 
representing their particular set of values and worldview. In other words, human dig-
nity is used as a linguistic-symbol that can represent different outlooks, thereby justify-
ing a concrete political agreement on a seemingly shared ground. ’ 165 This is not to imply 
that dignity has no content at all. Unlike in linguistics, where a placeholder carries no 
semantic information, dignity carried an enormous amount of content, but different 
content for different people. As we have seen, human dignity was a rallying cry in intel-
lectual debate across the political and philosophical spectrum. At the same time as Mari-
tain, the Catholic philosopher, was publicizing his conception of human dignity, Jean 
Paul Sartre was arguing that genuine human dignity could be achieved only through 
existentialism. 166 Although coming from apparently opposite ends of the philosophical 
spectrum, they agreed that the proper objective was human dignity. 
 163  E.g., during the drafting of the UDHR, the Netherlands delegate regretted that  ‘ man’s divine origins and 
immortal destiny had not been mentioned in the declaration, for the fount of all those rights was the 
Supreme Being, who laid a great responsibility on those who claimed them. To ignore that relation was 
almost the same as severing a plant from its roots, or building a house and forgetting the foundation ’ : UN 
GA, Summary Records, at 874, quoted in S.R.S. Bedi,  The Development of Human Rights Law by the Judges 
of the International Court of Justice (2007), at 52. 
 164  Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations: A Symposium edited by UNESCO (intro. J. Maritain, 1948), 
especially at 16. On Maritain’s role see Glendon,  supra note 154. 
 165  Shultziner,  supra note 50, at 5. 
 166  Sartre,  ‘ Existentialism is a Humanism ’ (1946), in W. Kaufman,  Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre 
(1975), at 345. 
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 B   An Overlapping Consensus: Towards a Minimum Core? 
 That said, it is possible to discern certain  ‘ family resemblances ’ 167 between these dif-
fering ways of viewing human dignity. In this family resemblance we can, perhaps, 
see the outlines of a basic minimum content of  ‘ human dignity ’ that all who use the 
term historically and all those who include it in human rights texts appear to agree is 
the core, whether they approve of it or disapprove of it. This basic minimum content 
seems to have at least three elements. 168 The ﬁ rst is that every human being possesses 
an intrinsic worth, merely by being human. The second is that this intrinsic worth 
should be recognized and respected by others, and some forms of treatment by others 
are inconsistent with, or required by, respect for this intrinsic worth. The ﬁ rst ele-
ment is what might be called the  ‘ ontological ’ claim; the second might be called the 
 ‘ relational ’ claim. This minimum core of the meaning of human dignity seems to be 
conﬁ rmed both by our discussion of the historical roots of dignity, and by the ways 
in which it has been incorporated into the human rights texts we have considered. 
The human rights texts have gone further and supplemented the relational element 
of the minimum core by supplying a third element regarding the relationship between 
the state and the individual. This is the claim that recognizing the intrinsic worth of 
the individual requires that the state should be seen to exist for the sake of the indi-
vidual human being, and not vice versa (the limited-state claim). In the remainder 
of the article, I shall use the term  ‘ minimum core ’ to describe these three basic ele-
ments. Although I shall go on to identify the incompleteness of the concept of dignity 
thus identiﬁ ed, we should not underestimate its importance. The concept of dignity, 
thus deﬁ ned, as Gerald Neuman has written, may be contrasted with political theories 
that have in the past commanded considerable support, such as  ‘ organic theories of 
nationalism that submerge the individual, with authoritarian political doctrines that 
condemn human nature as degraded by sin, with racist doctrines of biological inferi-
ority and with aristocratic doctrines of national hierarchy ’ . 169 
 This concept of human dignity is, of course, stated at a very high level of generality. 
Even if we accept these three claims, the concept of human dignity holds within it the 
seeds for much debate. We can say, on the basis of what we have described up to this 
point, that whilst there is a  concept of human dignity with a minimum core, there are 
several different  conceptions of human dignity, 170 and these differ signiﬁ cantly because 
there appears to be no consensus politically or philosophically on how any of the three 
 167  L. Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations (trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edn, 1958), at 32 (paras 66 
and 67). 
 168  I am grateful to Gerald Neuman for this insight. See  ‘ Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law ’ , 
in D. Simon and M. Weiss (eds),  Zur Autonomie des Individuums: Liber Amicorum Spiros Simitis (2000), at 
249, 249 – 250, from which the three elements are derived. 
 169  Ibid ., at 250. 
 170  I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron for this insight. The distinction probably originates in Gallie,  ‘ Essentially 
Contested Concepts ’ , 56  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1956) 167. Alexy,  A Theory of Constitution-
al Rights (2nd edn, 2002), at 233, also distinguishes between  ‘ a single concept and varying conceptions 
of human dignity ’ in his discussion of the use of human dignity in German constitutional law. 
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claims that make up the core of the concept are best understood. They differ, in other 
words, on their understanding of what the intrinsic worth of the individual human 
being consists in (the ontological claim), in their understanding of what forms of treat-
ment are inconsistent with this worth (the relational claim), and in their understand-
ing of what the detailed implications of accepting the ontological and relational claims 
are for the role of the state  vis-à-vis the individual, beyond the core idea that the indi-
vidual does not exist for the state (the limited-state claim). 
 4   Finding Human Dignity in Judicial Discourse on Rights: 
Beyond the Minimum Core? 
 Further discussion of the meaning and implications of differing conceptions of dignity 
might have remained largely conﬁ ned to political and philosophical debate, as some 
have argued would be preferable. 171 Instead, we shall see in this part of the article that 
dignity has also come to be used extensively in the  judicial interpretation and applica-
tion of human rights texts. Given the very diversity of the use of dignity throughout 
the judicial world, this section cannot claim to be comprehensive. Instead, I shall draw 
on examples at the international, regional, and domestic levels to illustrate the range 
of this judicial dignity language. What we shall see are attempts to engage, in diverse 
settings, with each of the three claims that I have described as making up the core 
concept of human dignity. The issue we shall be concerned with is how far, if at all, 
an overlapping consensus can be identiﬁ ed which goes beyond simply accepting the 
core identiﬁ ed above. Has progress been made on developing a judicial consensus on 
how we should best understand the basis for and the implications of the ontological, 
relational, or state claims? 
 On the basis of this analysis, we can identify several understandings that those 
using dignity language in the judicial context seem to have. In one use, dignity is 
seen as providing the basis for human rights in general, in the sense of providing a 
key argument as to why humans should have rights, and what the limits of these 
rights may be. In this sense, dignity is the basis for human rights to exist, and there 
are thinner and thicker variations of this approach. 172 In the thinnest approach, dig-
nity is viewed as simply another way of expressing the idea of a catalogue of human 
rights. 173 Dignity neither adds to, nor detracts from, rather it is coterminous with, 
human rights and therefore adds little to the debate on what rights there are or how 
they should be interpreted. 174 Others adopt a somewhat thicker view of dignity, 
 171  See, e.g., Schachter,  ‘ Human Dignity as a Normative Concept ’ , 77  Am Soc Int’l L (1983) 848, at 853. 
 172  Schultziner,  supra note 50, round fn. 28. 
 173  This also has several modern philosophical exponents such as Joel Feinberg and James Grifﬁ n,  supra note 52. 
 174  So, Joel Feinberg, e.g., writes:  ‘ [r]espect for persons may simply be respect for their rights, so that there 
cannot be the one without the other; and what is called  “ human dignity ” may simply be the recogniz-
able capacity to assert claims. To respect a person then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity 
simply is to think of him as a potential maker of claims ’ :  ‘ The Nature and Value of Rights ’ [1970]  J Value 
Inquiry 243, at 252. 
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seeing it not as a synonym for human rights but rather as expressing a value unique 
to itself, on which human rights are built. It is this thicker view that appears to be 
at work in the judicial decisions we shall consider below. In this thicker use, the 
role that dignity plays is primarily to help in the identiﬁ cation of a catalogue of spe-
ciﬁ c rights. This catalogue is not closed, however, and the general principle may 
continue to generate more rights over time as its implications are better understood 
or changes occur which give rise to new situations that require the application of 
the general principle for the ﬁ rst time. More generally, however, dignity becomes 
an interpretive principle to assist the further explication of the catalogue of rights 
generated by the principle. Some (or all) of the rights then come to be seen as best 
interpreted through the lens of dignity.  
 Dignity can, additionally, be seen as itself a right or obligation with speciﬁ c con-
tent, and not only as the basis for human rights in general, or a catalogue of speciﬁ c 
rights. In some jurisdictions, human dignity is recognized as a right enforceable by 
an individual in the same way as any other right. In others, human dignity is a prin-
ciple which stands behind other individual rights but does not give rise to enforce-
ment by an individual. In Germany, there is a continuing academic debate as to 
what particular status human dignity has in this respect, 175 although in that context 
the signiﬁ cance of the debate may be less than it appears, since  ‘ [i]n all cases before 
the Constitutional Court in which questions of human dignity arose the alleged vio-
lation of human dignity went along with alleged violations of other individual rights 
so that access to the Court never depended on the qualiﬁ cation of human dignity as 
an individual right ’ . 176 
 This multi-faceted approach to the role of dignity is well captured in  Dawood v. 
Minister of Home Affairs , a South African Constitutional Court decision. 177  ‘ Human 
dignity  … informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. 
It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights. This 
court has already acknowledged the importance of the constitutional value of dig-
nity in interpreting rights such as the right to equality, the right not to be punished 
in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, and the right to life. Human dignity is also a 
constitutional value that is of central signiﬁ cance in the limitations analysis. ’ 178 The 
Court continued:  ‘ dignity is not only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a 
justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and protected. In many cases, 
however, where the value of human dignity is offended, the primary constitutional 
breach occasioned may be of a more speciﬁ c right such as the right to bodily integrity, 
the right to equality or the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced 
labour. ’ 179 
 175  Klein,  ‘ Human Dignity in German Law ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 4, at 145, 147. 
 176  Walter,  ‘ Human Dignity in German Constitutional Law ’ , in European Commission for Democracy 
through Law,  supra note 14, at 27. 
 177  [2000] 5 Law Reports of the Commonwealth 147, 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
 178  Ibid., at para. 35 (O’Regan J). 
 179  Ibid . 
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 A   Dignity is Drawn On by Judges in a Wide Range of Different 
Jurisdictions 
 1  International Court of Justice 
 At ﬁ rst sight, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) appears to be an exception to 
the trend of courts resorting to dignity language. It is true that the concept of dignity 
appears not infrequently in the judgments of the Court, but these uses are conﬁ ned to 
dignity as referring to the dignity of nation states, and by extension to the dignity of 
ambassadorial and consular ofﬁ cials, rather than in the human rights context. So far 
as I have been able to discover, the Court has not used the concept of human dignity in 
the human rights context. However, on closer inspection, there has been a signiﬁ cant 
use of dignity (in the human rights context) in concurring and (more often) dissenting 
opinions by individual members of the ICJ. 180 Thus, we ﬁ nd dignity being drawn on by 
Judge Tanaka 181 and Vice President Ammoun 182 in the 1971  South West Africa case to 
support their argument that the practices of racial discrimination and apartheid were 
contrary to international law; by Judge de Castro 183 and Vice President Ammoun 184 
to suggest how administrative procedures should operate where they were applied to 
employees in the 1973 case reviewing a decision of the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal; by Judge Shahabuddeen 185 to support his 1996 conclusion that the use of 
nuclear weapons was contrary to human rights guarantees; by Judge Weeramantry 
in 1996 as part of his argument relating to the application of the crime of genocide; 186 
 180  See, in general, Bedi,  supra note 163. 
 181  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in the  South West Africa Case :  ‘ [i]n any case, as we have seen above, 
all human beings are equal before the law and have equal opportunities without regard to religion, race, 
language, sex, social groups, etc. As persons they have the dignity to be treated as such. This is the prin-
ciple of equality which constitutes one of the fundamental human rights and freedoms which are universal 
to al1 mankind.  … The Respondent probably being aware of the unreasonableness in such hard cases, 
tries to explain it as a necessary sacriﬁ ce which should be paid by individuals for the maintenance of 
social security. But it is unjust to require a sacriﬁ ce for the sake of social security when this sacriﬁ ce is of 
such importance as humiliation of the dignity of the personality ’ :  South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South 
Africa; Liberia v. South Africa (Second Phase), Judgment of 18 July 1966, [1966] ICJ Rep 6, at 308, 312. 
 182  Separate Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun (translation) in  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 , 
Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, at 77:  ‘ [i]t is not by mere chance that in Article 
1 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man there stands, so worded, this primordial principle or 
axiom:  “ All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. ” From this ﬁ rst principle ﬂ ow 
most rights and freedoms. Of all human rights, the right to equality is far and away the most important. 
It is also the one which has been longest recognized as a natural right: it may even be said that the doc-
trine of natural law was born in ancient times with the concept of human equality as its ﬁ rst element. ’ 
 183  Dissenting Opinion of Judge de Castro in  Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal [1973] ICJ Rep 166, at 291. 
 184  Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun (translation) in  ibid., at 247. 
 185  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , Advisory 
Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, at 383 (quoting Max Huber, Acting President, ICRC). 
 186  Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro ), Preliminary Objections [1996] 
ICJ Rep 595, at 641:  ‘ [o]ne of the principal concerns of the contemporary international legal system is the 
protection of the human rights and dignity of every individual ’ . 
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in 2002 by Judge Ranjeva regarding the attempted exercise by Belgium of universal 
jurisdiction; 187 by Judge Elaraby in 2004 regarding the mutual obligations of Israelis 
and Palestinians in the context of the disputed security fence erected by Israel in occu-
pied Palestinian territory; 188 and by Judge Koroma to underscore the importance of 
the international obligations which he held Uganda had violated in its armed activi-
ties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 189 
 2   European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice 
 In the European context, an apparent exception to the incorporation of dignity in 
human rights texts after the Second World War is to be found in the ECHR. Subse-
quently, however, interpretations of the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights, particularly of the Article 3 ECHR prohibition of torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment, have drawn extensively on the concept of 
human dignity as a basis for their decisions. The ﬁ rst references to human dignity 
appeared in the decision of the Commission in the  East African Asian case where the 
racial discrimination the applicants were subjected to constituted an infringement of 
their human dignity, 190 which in the particular circumstances of the case amounted 
to degrading treatment. The ﬁ rst reference by the Court (ECtHR) to human dignity 
was in  Tyrer v. UK in which corporal punishment, administered as part of a judicial 
sentence, was held to be contrary to Article 3 on the ground that it was an assault 
 ‘ on precisely that which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely 
a person’s dignity and physical integrity ’ . 191 Since then, it has been drawn on in the 
context of the right to a fair hearing, 192 the right not to be punished in the absence of 
a legal prohibition, 193 the prohibition of torture, 194 and the right to private life. 195 The 
Court now regards human dignity as underpinning all of the rights protected by the 
Convention. 196 
 Human dignity has also been incorporated judicially as a general principle of Euro-
pean Community law, deriving from the constitutional traditions common to Member 
States. Advocate General Jacobs stated in 1993,  ‘ the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States in general allow for the conclusion that there exists a principle according 
to which the State must respect not only the individual’s physical well-being, but also 
 187  Declaration of Judge Ranjeva in  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium ) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 at 55. 
 188  Separate opinion of Judge Elaraby in  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory , Advisory Opinion [2005] ICJ Rep 136, at 255. 
 189  Declaration by Judge Koroma, Dissenting Opinion,  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep, at paras 6 and 13. 
 190  East African Asians v. United Kingdom, 3 EHRR (1981) 76, at paras 203 – 207. 
 191  Tyrer v United Kingdom, 2 EHRR 1, at para. 33. 
 192  Bock v. Germany , 12 EHRR (1990) 247, at para. 48. 
 193  SW v. UK; CR v. UK, 21 EHRR (1995) 363, at para. 44. 
 194  Ribitsch v. Austria, 21 EHRR (1995) 573, at para. 38. 
 195  Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 EHRR (2002) 447, at paras 90 – 91. 
 196  Pretty v. United Kingdom, 24 EHRR (1997) 423, at para. 65:  ‘ [t]he very essence of the Convention is 
respect for human dignity and human freedom ’ . 
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his dignity, moral integrity and sense of personal identity ’ . 197 In a second case, interpret-
ing the Community Directive prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, in which 
it was held that the Directive prohibited dismissal from employment on the basis of a 
person’s transsexuality, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that  ‘ to tolerate such 
discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect 
the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty 
to safeguard ’ . 198 In  Omega , the Court held that  ‘ the Community legal order undeniably 
strives to ensure respect for human dignity as a general principle of law ’ . 199 
 3   Domestic Judicial Interpretation of Rights 
 The judiciary in several national jurisdictions enthusiastically further the incorpo-
ration and use of dignity in domestic rights discourse. 200 The concept of dignity was 
introduced into United States Supreme Court jurisprudence by the two justices most 
inﬂ uenced by labour thinking (Frankfurter and Murphy JJ) and Catholic thinking 
(Murphy J) in the immediate post-War period. 201 Indeed, that tradition continued 
most prominently in the opinions of Brennan J who was also strongly inﬂ uenced by 
both Catholic and labour thinking, and was also the justice most associated with the 
concept of dignity. 202 Since then, the Supreme Court has used the concept of human 
dignity in the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, 203 the Due Process Clause, 204 
the extent of privacy rights in the abortion context, 205 and in First Amendment free 
speech cases. 206 More recently, justices have referred to  ‘ personal dignity ’ in striking 
down legal prohibitions on homosexual sodomy, 207 and the  ‘ dignity of man ’ in prohib-
iting the execution of those who are mentally retarded. 208 
 197  Case C – 168/91,  Christos Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I – 1191, at para. 39 of the AG’s Opinion. 
 198  Case C – 13/94,  P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I – 2143, at para. 22. See also Maduro AG 
in Case C – 303/06,  Coleman v. Law , Judgment of 31 Jan. 2008, at paras 8 – 10, 12 – 13, 15, and 22. 
 199  Case C – 36/02,  Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs- GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn [2004] ECR I – 9609, at para 34. See also Case C – 377/98,  Netherlands v. European Parliament and 
Council [2001] ECR I – 7079. 
 200  See, e.g., Moon and Allen,  ‘ Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to Equality ’ , 6  Euro-
pean Human Rights L Rev (2006) 610, at 626, referring to the  ‘ exponential growth in dignity discourse in 
the courts of England and Wales ’ . 
 201  For Murphy J’s use of dignity see the immediate post-War cases  In re Yamashita , 327 US 1, at 29 (1946) (dis-
sent);  Homma v. Patterson , 327 US 759, at 760 (1946) (dissent);  Duncan v. Kahanamoku , 427 US 304, at 334 
(1946) (concurrence). For an example of Frankfurter J’s use of dignity see  American Federation of Labor v. Amer-
ican Sash and Door Co , 335 US 538, at 542 (1949). See further H.N. Hirsch,  The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 
(1981); St Antoine,  ‘ Justice Frank Murphy and American Labor Law ’ , 100  Michigan L Rev (2002) 1900. 
 202  Berger,  ‘ Justice Brennan,  “ Human Dignity ” and Constitutional Interpretation ’ , in M.J. Meyer and W.A. 
Parent (eds),  The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (1992), at 129. 
 203  Trop v. Dulles , 356 US 86, at 1000 (1958) ( ‘ [t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man ’ ). For a review of the use of dignity in the US Sup. Ct up to the early 
1980s see Paust,  ‘ Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Cri-
teria and Content ’ , 27  Howard LJ (1984) 145. 
 204  Rochin v California , 342 US 165, at 174 (1952). 
 205  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey , 505 US 833 (1992). 
 206  See generally S.J. Heyman,  Free Speech and Human Dignity (2008). 
 207  Lawrence v. Texas , 539 US 558, at 574 (2003) (Kennedy, J). 
 208  Atkins v. Virginia , 536 US 304 (2002). 
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 Even in countries where dignity had been earlier incorporated but removed (such 
as in the Canadian Bill of Rights), the courts continued to use the idea of dignity to 
interpret the new Charter of rights, indeed building it into a central principle of adjudi-
cation. 209 In other jurisdictions, the courts anticipated the introduction of human dig-
nity into legal texts. In Israel, human dignity was frequently invoked by the Supreme 
Court prior to the adoption of the Basic Law on human dignity. 210 Where it was not 
explicitly written into the text of the constitutions which emerged in central Europe 
from the ﬁ rst wave of constitutional revisions in the 1990s, several constitutional 
courts inferred it anyway, for example in Poland, 211 anticipating its subsequent incor-
poration in the text of the 1997 Constitution. 212 So too in other European states, such 
as France, the concept of dignity was drawn on in important  Conseil d’Etat and  Conseil 
Constitutionnel decisions. In one of its judgments the  Conseil Constitutionnel held that 
 ‘ [t]he preamble to the 1946 Constitution reafﬁ rmed and proclaimed rights, freedoms 
and constitutional principles, declaring  …  “ In the morrow of the victory achieved by 
the free peoples over the regimes that had sought to enslave and degrade humanity, 
the people of France proclaim anew that each human being, without distinction of 
race, religion or creed, possesses sacred and inalienable rights ” ; it follows that the pro-
tection of human dignity against all forms of enslavement or degradation is a principle 
of constitutional status ’ . 213 
 B   Dignity is Increasingly Present in the Interpretation of Particular 
Substantive Areas 
 Whether dignity is used as a principle with speciﬁ c content, or as a right, or as an obli-
gation, or as a justiﬁ cation, particular values seem particularly closely related to the 
judicial interpretation of the core idea of dignity. Sometimes dignity is viewed as par-
ticularly associated with individual autonomy where, for example, a woman’s freedom to 
have an abortion is upheld on the basis of dignity. Sometimes dignity is viewed as par-
ticularly associated with freedom from humiliation as, for example, where restrictions 
are placed on the publication of information or data that would lead to a person being 
pilloried. Sometimes dignity is seen as particularly associated with protecting individu-
als from severe physical or mental torment inﬂ icted by the authorities, thus prohibiting 
torture and other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment. Sometimes dignity is seen 
 209  Ullrich,  ‘ Concurring Visions: Human Dignity in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany ’ , 3(1)  Global Jurist Frontiers 1. 
 210  Kretzmer,  ‘ Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein,  supra note 4, at 161, 163 –
 165. 
 211  Polish Constitutional Tribunal, judgment of 17 Mar. 1993, referred to by Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska, 
 ‘ The Principle of Respect for Human Dignity ’ , in European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
 supra note 14, at 17. 
 212  Polish Constitution, 1997,  supra note 140, Art. 30. 
 213  Conseil Constitutionnel , decision 94/343/344 DC, 27 July 1994, available at : www.conseil-constitutionnel.
fr/langues/anglais/a94343dc.pdf. 
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as particularly associated with protection from discrimination. In an important inter-
vention, Andrew Clapham has usefully suggested that: 
 concern for human dignity has at least four aspects: (1) the prohibition of all types of inhu-
man treatment, humiliation, or degradation by one person over another; (2) the assurance 
of the possibility for individual choice and the conditions for  ‘ each individual’s self-fulﬁ lment ’ , 
autonomy, or self-realization; (3) the recognition that the protection of group identity and cul-
ture may be essential for the protection of personal dignity; (4) the creation of the necessary 
conditions for each individual to have their essential needs satisﬁ ed. 214 
 We can use this rough categorization as a useful starting point for our analysis of 
the cases, whilst recognizing that these are overlapping categories. 
 1   Prohibition of Inhuman Treatment, Humiliation, or Degradation by One Person 
Over Another 
 Dignity has ﬁ gured prominently in decisions concerning the meaning and scope of 
prohibitions on torture and cognate terms, such as inhuman or degrading treatment. 
In his separate opinion in  Ireland v. United Kingdom , 215 Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
identiﬁ ed the concept of human dignity as central to the idea of what constituted 
 ‘ degrading ’ treatment under Article 3 ECHR:  ‘ [i]n the present context it can be 
assumed that it is, or should be, intended to denote something seriously humiliating, 
lowering as to human dignity, or disparaging, like having one’s head shaved, being 
tarred and feathered, smeared with ﬁ lth, pelted with muck, paraded naked in front of 
strangers, forced to eat excreta, deface the portrait of one’s sovereign or head of State, 
or dress up in a way calculated to provoke ridicule or contempt  … ’ . 216 So too, in the 
separate opinion of Judge Evrigenis in the same case, dignity is regarded as central to 
what is protected by prohibitions on inhuman treatment. 217  ‘ By adding to the notion 
of torture the notions of inhuman and degrading treatment, those who drew up the 
Convention wished  … to extend the prohibition in Article 3  … of the Convention – 
in principle directed against torture  … to other categories of acts causing intolerable 
suffering to individuals or affecting their dignity rather than to exclude from the tra-
ditional notion of torture certain apparently less serious forms of torture and to place 
them in the category of inhuman treatment which carries less of a  “ stigma ” – to use 
the word appearing in the judgment. The clear intention of widening the scope of the 
prohibition in Article 3  … by adding, alongside torture, other kinds of acts cannot 
have the effect of restricting the notion of torture. ’ 218 
 Since then, the ECtHR has increasingly resorted to the use of dignity language in 
interpreting Article 3. In  Selmouni v. France 219 the Court  ‘ reiterates that, in respect of 
a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made 
 214  Clapham,  supra note 97, at 545 – 546. 
 215  2 EHRR 25. 
 216  Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice,  ibid., at para. 27. 
 217  Opinion of Judge Evrigenis,  ibid., at (a). 
 218  Opinion of Judge Evrigenis,  ibid., at (i). 
 219  23 EHRR (1999) 403. 
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strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an 
infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 ’ . 220 In  Pretty v. United Kingdom , the Court 
said,  ‘ As regards the types of  “ treatment ” which fall within the scope of article 3 of the 
Convention, the court’s case law refers to  “ ill-treatment ” that attains a minimum level 
of severity and involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. 
Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or 
diminishing, his or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferior-
ity capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be char-
acterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of article 3. ’ 221 So too, the 
Israeli Supreme Court has held that the concept of dignity was squarely implicated by 
similar interrogation methods adopted by the Israeli security forces. 222 
 Dignity has also frequently been used by courts in the context of considering the 
death penalty. Brennan, J, of the US Supreme Court perhaps started the trend in  Fur-
man v. Georgia . 223 In considering the application of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishments, he summed up the previous jurisprudence 
on the Amendment as  ‘ prohibit[ing] the inﬂ iction of uncivilized and inhuman punish-
ments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their 
intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is  “ cruel and unusual, ” therefore, if 
it does not comport with human dignity. ’ 224 In  Gregg v. Georgia , 225 he considered that 
 ‘ [t]he fatal constitutional inﬁ rmity in the punishment of death is that it treats  “ mem-
bers of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. [It 
is] thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest 
criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity ” ’ . 226 
 So, too, the Canadian Supreme Court has recognized in  Kindler v. Canada that capital 
punishment constitutes a serious impairment of human dignity. 227 Three of the seven 
judges who heard the cases expressed the opinion that the death penalty was cruel and 
unusual:  ‘ [i]t is the supreme indignity to the individual, the ultimate corporal punish-
ment, the ﬁ nal and complete lobotomy and the absolute and irrevocable castration. 
[It is] the ultimate desecration of human dignity … ’ 228 Three other Judges were of the 
opinion that  ‘ [t]here is strong ground for believing, having regard to the limited extent 
to which the death penalty advances any valid penological objectives and the serious 
invasion of human dignity it endangers, that the death penalty cannot, except in excep-
tional circumstances, be justiﬁ ed in this country ’ . 229 The Hungarian Constitutional 
 220  Ibid., at para. 99. 
 221  35 EHRR (2002) 1, at 33, para. 52. 
 222  Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, HC 5100/94, HC 4054/95, HC 6536/95, HC 
5188/96, HC 7563/97, HC 7628/97, HC 1043/99, at paras 18 ff (President Barak). 
 223  408 US 238 (1972). 
 224  Ibid., at 270. 
 225  428 US 153 (1976). 
 226  Ibid., at 230. 
 227  Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 SCR 779. 
 228  Ibid., at 818 (Cory J, dissenting). 
 229  Ibid., at 833 (La Forest J). 
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Court has also considered that capital punishment imposes a limitation on the essential 
content of the fundamental rights to life and human dignity, eliminating them irretriev-
ably. As such it was unconstitutional. 230 The Court stressed the relationship between 
the rights to life and dignity, and the absolute nature of these two rights taken together. 
Together they were the source of all other rights. 
 These approaches strongly inﬂ uenced the approach adopted by Chaskalson P in 
the South African  Makwanyane case, 231 in which dignity also played a major role lead-
ing to the decision that the death penalty was unconstitutional. The carrying out of 
the death penalty, he wrote,  ‘ destroys life, which is protected without reservation 
under section 9 of our Constitution, it annihilates human dignity which is protected 
under section 10, elements of arbitrariness are present in its enforcement and it is 
irremediable ’ . 232 The rights to life and dignity were  ‘ the most important of all human 
rights, and the source of all other personal rights  … ’ . 233 By  ‘ committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two 
rights above all others. And this must be demonstrated by the State in everything that 
it does, including the way it punishes criminals. This is not achieved by objectifying 
murderers and putting them to death to serve as an example to others in the expecta-
tion that they might possibly be deterred thereby. ’ 234 Mokgoro J also emphasized the 
importance of dignity in this context, and sought to link the concept of dignity with 
the native African concept of  ‘ ubuntu ’ :  ‘ [g]enerally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. 
In its most fundamental sense, it translates as personhood and morality. Metaphori-
cally, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the signiﬁ cance 
of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of communities. While 
it envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, 
conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes 
humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a 
shift from confrontation to conciliation. ’ 235 
 2   Individual Choice and the Conditions for Self-fulﬁ lment, Autonomy, and 
Self-realization 
 Dignity has been central to the approach which several jurisdictions take to the 
woman’s interest in deciding whether to have an abortion. In the case of  Thornburg v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 236 Blackmun J explained the fun-
damental nature of the privacy of a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy: 
 ‘ [f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic 
to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision – with the guidance of 
 230  Hungarian Constitutional Court, 24 Oct. 1990. 
 231  State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu , 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
 232  Ibid., at para. 95. 
 233  Ibid., at para. 144. 
 234  Ibid. 
 235  Ibid., at para. 308. 
 236  476 US 747 (1986). 
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her physician and within the limits speciﬁ ed in  Roe – whether to end her pregnancy. 
A woman’s right to make that choice freely is fundamental. ’ 237 So too, in  Planned Par-
enthood v Casey , 238 both the plurality opinion of Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter JJ 
and the individual opinion of Stevens J used dignity language to support the woman’s 
right to choose. In the plurality opinion, the woman’s autonomy interest in making 
the abortion decision is seen as one of several spheres in which dignity required state 
abstention: 
 Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.  … Our cases recog-
nize  ‘ the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child. ’  … Our precedents  ‘ have respected the private realm of family life which the state 
cannot enter. ’  … These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to deﬁ ne 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not deﬁ ne the attributes of personhood were they formed 
under compulsion of the State. 239 
 Justice Stevens also considered the relationship between dignity and privacy to be 
a close one:  ‘ [t]he woman’s constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to 
decide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal nature.  … The authority 
to make such traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an element of basic human 
dignity. ’ 240 So, too, in the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court regarding 
abortion, the Court considered that the issue of dignity was engaged:  ‘ [i]t has been 
constantly stated by the Constitutional Court that among the rights to be weighed 
against the State’s duty to give increased protection to foetal life, the mother’s right 
to self-determination  – as part of the right to human dignity  – is the most important 
one ’ . 241 
 3   Protection of Group Identity and Culture 
 The principle of human dignity is often drawn on as one of several values that anti-
discrimination norms further. We have seen already that Judge Tanaka and Vice 
President Ammoun drew on dignity in the  South West Africa case to explain the under-
lying wrong which apartheid occasioned. 242 Some have argued, indeed, that the con-
cept of dignity is the most appropriate normative basis for viewing anti-discrimination 
law generally. Réaume argues, for example, that unless equality or a prohibition on 
discrimination means that everyone must be treated the same all of the time, judges 
need some basis for deciding which distinctions are permissible and which are not. 243 
 237  Ibid., at 772. 
 238  505 US 833 (1992). 
 239  Ibid., at 851 (internal citations omitted). 
 240  Ibid., at 915 – 916. 
 241  Decision 48/1998 (IX.23) AB, at para. 3(b). 
 242  Supra at notes 181 and 182. 
 243  Réaume,  ‘ Discrimination and Dignity ’ , 63  Louisiana L Rev (2003) 645. 
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A conception of dignity can provide that explanation. So too, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has held that the  ‘ notion of equality springs directly from the 
oneness of the human family and is linked to the essential dignity of the individual ’ . 244 
Because of this, the Court explained,  ‘ it follows that not all differences in legal treat-
ment are discriminatory as such, for not all differences in treatment are in themselves 
offensive to human dignity ’ . 245 Accordingly, no discrimination existed if the difference 
in treatment had a legitimate purpose. 246 
 There has been a particular increase in the use of dignity arguments in the judi-
cial interpretation of constitutional and statutory equality and anti-discrimination 
requirements in several jurisdictions. 247 We have already seen examples in the con-
text of the interpretation of Article 3 by the ECtHR as applied to racial discrimination. 
The European Commission of Human Rights in  East African Asians v. United Kingdom 
held that  ‘ publicly to single out a group of persons for differential treatment on the 
basis of race might, in certain circumstances, constitute a special form of affront to 
human dignity ’ , 248 a decision applied very recently in  Moldovan v. Romania , 249 where 
the ECtHR upheld the claim of a number of Roma that their rights under Article 14 had 
been breached. In addition to providing a theoretical underpinning to constitutional 
and statutory equality guarantees, dignity has been drawn on heavily as a theoretical 
underpinning by judges in interpreting prohibitions against sexual harassment, both 
in Europe and the United States. 250 
 Dignity has also come to play an increasingly important foundational role in the 
judicial interpretation of the meaning of constitutional anti-discrimination prohibi-
tions in Canada 251 and South Africa. 252 Indeed, the purpose of the right to equality in 
the Canadian Charter, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, is to:  ‘ prevent the 
violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvan-
tage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which 
 244  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 Jan. 1986 ( Proposed Amend-
ments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica requested by the Government of Costa 
Rica ), at paras 55 – 56. 
 245  Ibid . 
 246  Ibid . 
 247  Equality and non-discrimination law encompass a wide variety of different measures, of course. In the 
context of this discussion, I will conﬁ ne myself to discussing the role that dignity plays in the context of 
what has been termed  ‘ status equality ’ , as it is in that context that the role of dignity is most prevalent. 
 248  3 EHRR (1973) 76, at 86, para. 207. 
 249  44 EHRR (2007) 16. 
 250  See Ehrenreich,  ‘ Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harass-
ment ’ , 88  Georgetown LJ (1999) 1. 
 251  Mendes,  ‘ Taking Equality into the 21st Century: Establishing the Concept of Equal Human Dignity ’ , 
12(1)  Nat’l J Constitutional L (2000) 3. 
 252  Huscroft,  ‘ Discrimination, Dignity and the Limits of Equality ’ , 9  Otago L Rev (2000) 697; Chaskalson, 
 ‘ Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order ’ , 16  South African J Human Rights 
(2000) 193; Sachs,  ‘ Equality Jurisprudence: The Origin of the Doctrine in the South African Constitu-
tional Court ’ , 5  Rev Constitutional Studies (1999) 76; Grant,  ‘ Dignity and Equality ’ [2007]  Human Rights 
Law Review 299. 
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all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Cana-
dian society, equally capable and deserving of concern, respect and consideration ’ . 253 
In  Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 254 Iacobucci J, writing for 
a unanimous court, described the importance of human dignity:  ‘ [h]uman dignity 
means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned 
with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is 
harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which 
do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which 
are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into 
account the context underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed when 
individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when 
laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian society. ’ 255 
Equally, the South African Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the Constitution’s 
equality guarantee has relied on a dignity-based approach, beginning with  President 
of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo . 256 Justice Goldstone stated that the prohibition of 
discrimination was intended to contribute to  ‘ the establishment of a society in which 
all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their mem-
bership in particular groups ’ . 257 
 There has been a signiﬁ cant relationship in several jurisdictions between dignity 
and the granting of rights to gay, lesbian, and trans-gendered individuals, begin-
ning with claims that the criminalization of sodomy was contrary to human rights 
principles, and continuing most recently in the context of claims to permit marriage 
between same-sex partners. In the 1998 South African case of  National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice , 258 Ackermann J stressed the extent to 
which the common law offence of sodomy was an infringement of the right to dignity, 
as well as equality. 
 There can be no doubt that the existence of a law which punishes a form of sexual expression 
for gay men degrades and devalues gay men in our broader society. As such it is a palpable 
invasion of their dignity and a breach of section 10 of the Constitution.  … The harm caused 
by the provision can, and often does, affect his ability to achieve self-identiﬁ cation and self-
fulﬁ llment. The harm also radiates out into society generally and gives rise to a wide variety of 
other discriminations, which collectively unfairly prevent a fair distribution of social goods and 
services and the award of social opportunities for gays. 259 
 253  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 SCR 497, at para. 51. 
 254  Ibid., at 530. 
 255  Ibid., at para. 53. 
 256  1997 (4) SA 1 (1997). 
 257  Ibid., at para. 41. For discussions of the South African approach, in addition to Chaskalson,  supra note 
252, and Sachs,  supra note 252, see Ackermann,  ‘ Equality and the South African Constitution: the Role 
of Dignity ’ , Bram Fischer Lecture, Oxford, May 2000. For a comparison between the US and South Africa 
see Kende,  ‘ Stereotypes in South African and American Constitutional Law: Achieving Gender Equality 
and Transformation ’ , 10  S California Rev L and Women’s Studies (2000) 3. 
 258  6 BHRC 127 (CC, 1998), 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC). 
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 Dignity has also been drawn on in order to support decisions which declared 
legal restrictions on marriage between same-sex couples to be unconstitutional. In 
 Halpern v. Attorney General , 260 the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized the relation-
ship between dignity and access to the institution of marriage: 
 Marriage is, without dispute, one of the most signiﬁ cant forms of personal relationships.  … 
This public recognition and sanction of marital relationships reﬂ ect society’s approbation of 
the personal hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal relation-
ships. This can only enhance an individual’s sense of self-worth and dignity. 261 
 Exclusion from marriage of same sex couples  ‘ perpetuates the view that same-sex 
relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex relationships. In doing 
so, it offends the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships. ’ 262 Similarly, in the South 
African case of  Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie , 263 Sachs J argued,  ‘ there can only be 
one answer to the question as to whether or not such couples are denied equal protec-
tion and subjected to unfair discrimination. Clearly, they are, and in no small degree. 
The effect has been wounding and the scars are evident in our society to this day. By 
both drawing on and reinforcing discriminatory social practices, the law in the past 
failed to secure for same-sex couples the dignity, status, beneﬁ ts and responsibilities 
that it accords to heterosexual couples. ’ 264 
 4   Creation of the Necessary Conditions for Individuals to Have Essential Needs 
Satisﬁ ed 
 Control over the use of lethal force by the state’s security forces has been seen as a nec-
essary condition for guaranteeing survival by some courts. In cases dealing with the 
use of force by the security forces, the German Constitutional Court has emphasized 
the importance of reading the protection of the right to life and the protection of dig-
nity as mutually reinforcing. 265 The Court held that provisions of the Aviation Secu-
rity Act which authorized the armed forces to shoot down aircraft that were intended 
to be used as weapons in crimes against human lives was incompatible with the Basic 
Law, and hence void. These provisions were incompatible with the fundamental right 
to life and with the guarantee of human dignity to the extent that the use of armed 
force affected persons on board the aircraft who were not participants in the crime. 
By the state’s using their killing as a means to save others, they were treated as mere 
objects, which denied them the value that was due to a human being for his or her 
own sake. So too, the Israeli Supreme Court in its decision on the use of targeted assas-
sination by the Israeli security services in the Occupied Territories, 266 considered that 
 260  (2003) 65 OR (3d) 161, CA for Ontario. 
 261  Ibid., at para. 5. 
 262  Ibid., at para. 107. 
 263  2006 (3) BCLR 355 (Constitutional Court). 
 264  Ibid., at para. 78. 
 265  Aviation Security Act Case , BVerfG, 1 BvR 357/05 of 15 Feb. 2006 (Germany); Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Press release No. 11/2006 of 15 Feb. 2006. 
 266  Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel , HCJ 769/02 (Sup Ct Israel Sitting as the 
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 ‘ unlawful combatants are not beyond the law. They are not  “ outlaws ” . God created 
them as well in his image; their human dignity as well is to be honored; they as well 
enjoy and are entitled to protection ’ . 267 
 Other courts have gone further, using dignity to expand the conception of the right 
to life to meet basic needs. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for exam-
ple, held that the right to life  ‘ includes, not only the right of every human being not 
to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented 
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a digniﬁ ed existence ’ . 268 On the 
basis of this interpretation, it challenged the lack of care provided to street children by 
the government of Guatemala. Similarly, the Indian Supreme Court interpreted the 
constitutional guarantee of life and personal liberty to include  ‘ the right to live with 
human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such 
as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, 
writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and 
commingling with fellow human beings ’ . 269 
 The provisions on socio-economic rights in human rights texts have also been inter-
preted as strongly engaging with dignity. Both the Hungarian and South African Consti-
tutional Courts, for example, have drawn on dignity to support their decisions regarding 
socio-economic rights. As regards the former, the Constitutional Court, in a case consid-
ering the characteristics and requirements regarding the right to social security, stated 
that (respecting the minimum level of beneﬁ ts)  ‘ the right to social security contained in 
Article 70/E of the Constitution entails the obligation of the State to secure a minimum 
livelihood through all of the welfare beneﬁ ts necessary for the realisation of the right to 
human dignity ’ . 270 In a subsequent case, 271 the Constitutional Court reiterated that  ‘ the 
beneﬁ ts to be offered in the framework of social institutions should secure a minimum 
level guaranteeing the enforcement of the right to human dignity. In case of services 
not reaching the above minimum level, the right to social security may not be deemed 
enforced. ’ 272 This required that  ‘ in case of homelessness, the State obligation to provide 
support shall include the provision of a shelter when an emergency situation directly 
threatens human life. The State obligation to provide shelter does not correspond to 
guaranteeing the  “ right to have a place of residence ” . 273 Thus, the State shall be respon-
sible for securing a shelter if homelessness directly threatens human life. Therefore, only 
in case of such an extreme situation is the State obliged to take care of those who them-
selves cannot provide for the fundamental preconditions of human life. ’ 274 
 267  Ibid ., at para. 25 (President (Emeritus) A. Barak). 
 268  Inter-American Court of Human Rights,  Case of the  ‘ Street Children ’ (Villagran-Morales v. Guatemala , Judg-
ment of Nov. 1999 (Merits), at para. 144. 
 269  Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SCR (2) 516, at 518. 
 270  Decision 32/1998 (VI. 25) AB, ABH 1998, 251, at 254. 
 271  Decision 42/2000 (XI. 8) AB, Constitutional Court ﬁ le number: 5/G/1998, published in the Ofﬁ cial 
Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) MK 2000/109. 
 272  Ibid., at Sect. IV. 
 273  Ibid., at Sect. V(2). 
 274  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (10) BHRC 84 (CC). 
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 A similar approach was taken by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the 
 Grootboom case, 275 in which Yacoob J also emphasized the connection between dig-
nity and socio-economic rights:  ‘ [t]here can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom 
and equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no 
food, clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore 
enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in [the Constitution’s Bill of Rights]. 
The realisation of these rights is also key to the advancement of race and gender equal-
ity and the evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve 
their full potential. ’ 276 The right to adequate housing  ‘ is entrenched because we value 
human beings and want to ensure that they are afforded their basic human needs. A 
society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to 
be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality. To be reasonable, meas-
ures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they 
endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability to 
enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed 
at achieving realisation of the right. ’ 277 In subsequent cases, the Constitutional Court 
has used the concept of dignity to develop a right for permanent residents to social 
security, 278 and a duty on a rail service provided by a state corporation to provide safe 
transportation for the communities which rely on it. 279 
 C   Universalism, Naturalism, and Dignity 
 There is an additional feature of the use of dignity in several jurisdictions that is 
noticeable. In applying dignity, judges in several jurisdictions draw on the judicial 
interpretation of dignity in  other jurisdictions as well as their own, sometimes explic-
itly, sometimes without attribution. The German Constitutional Court has been par-
ticularly inﬂ uential in Hungary and Israel, for example. 280 Judges in the common law 
tradition have become prominent in the spreading of dignity. The House of Lords, for 
example, has begun to use the concept of human dignity. 281 There is also a signiﬁ -
cant cross-fertilization between the German-inﬂ uenced and the common law in this 
respect. German and Hungarian judicial decisions have inﬂ uenced South African 
jurisprudence. 282 One of the attractions of dignity in the human rights context is the 
 275  Ibid., at para. 23. 
 276  Ibid . 
 277  Ibid., at para. 44. 
 278  Khosa v. Minister of Social Development , 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
 279  Rail Commuters Action Group v. Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail , 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC). See further Davis,  ‘ Socio-
economic Rights, The Promise and the Limitation: The South African Experience ’ , in D. Barak-Erez and 
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idea that different jurisdictions share a sense of what dignity requires, and this enables 
a dialogue to take place between judges on the interpretation of human rights norms, 
based on a supposedly shared assumption. 
 One of the best examples of this is to be found in the decision of the US Supreme 
Court in the case of  Roper v. Simmons , 283 in which it held that the imposition of the 
death penalty on offenders under 18 was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment. In his opinion for the Court, Kennedy J drew on  ‘ foreign ’ material, apparently 
demonstrating  ‘ that the United States is the only country in the world that continues 
to give ofﬁ cial sanction to the juvenile death penalty ’ , 284 to support a determination 
that such uses of capital punishment are unconstitutional under the US Constitu-
tion. 285 He stressed, too, that such information has relatively frequently been used by 
the Court  ‘ as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of  “ cruel and unusual punishments ” ’ . 286 
 No doubt anticipating an attack on his use of these sources, the relevant section of his 
opinion ended with his reﬂ ection on the question whether the use of  ‘ foreign ’ material 
in some way undermined the independent role of the Court in interpreting the Consti-
tution. He sought to dampen down concerns that it might.  ‘ The document sets forth, 
and rests upon, innovative principles original to the American experience, such as  … 
broad provisions to secure individual freedom and preserve human dignity. These doc-
trines and guarantees are central to the American experience and remain essential to 
our present-day self-deﬁ nition and national identity.  … It does not lessen our ﬁ delity 
to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express afﬁ rma-
tion of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores 
the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom. ’ 287 O’Connor 
also saw the use of comparative material in the interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment as particularly appropriate,  ‘ reﬂ ect[ing its] special character ’ which  ‘ draws its 
meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized society ’ . 288 The United States ’ 
 ‘ evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, 
nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, 
we should not be surprised to ﬁ nd congruence between domestic and international 
values, especially where the international community has reached clear agreement 
 … that a particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human 
rights. ’ 289 The results of such an inquiry into these international values  – and here 
she agrees with the majority  –  ‘ do not dictate the outcome of our Eighth Amendment 
inquiry ’ , but where  ‘ an international consensus of this nature ’ exists this  ‘ can serve to 
conﬁ rm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus ’ . 290 
 283  125 S Ct 1183 (2005). 
 284  Kennedy J in  ibid., at 1198. 
 285  Kennedy J in  ibid. 
 286  Kennedy J in  ibid., at 1199. 
 287  Kennedy J in  ibid., at 1200 (emphasis added). 
 288  O’Connor J in  ibid., at 1215. 
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 Paolo Carozza’s discussion of this phenomenon in the context of capital punish-
ment adjudication considered that there was a  ‘ common enterprise ’ across different 
jurisdictions in these cases, viz the  ‘ concrete speciﬁ cation of the principles of natural 
law ’ . 291 He continued:  ‘ the tendency of courts in the death penalty cases  … to consist-
ently place their appeal to foreign sources on the level of the shared premise of the 
fundamental value of human dignity is a paradigmatic example of naturalist founda-
tions at work. Despite differences in positive law, in historical and political context, 
in religious and cultural heritage, there is the common recognition of the worth of 
the human person as a fundamental principle to which the positive law should be 
accountable. The  “ common enterprise ”  … is, ﬁ rst and foremost, the working out of 
the practical implications, in differing concrete contexts, of human dignity for the 
rights to life and physical integrity. ’ 292 
 It certainly seems to be the case, as Carozza clearly demonstrates, that judges in sev-
eral jurisdictions see dignity as giving them a licence to draw on decisions from other 
jurisdictions. There is clearly a perception that the conception of dignity is common 
to these jurisdictions and the use of dignity in one judicial decision justiﬁ es the use of 
that jurisprudence by courts interpreting the concept of dignity in another jurisdic-
tion. Carozza’s argument thus seems supported by judicial practice. Not only is the 
enterprise of human rights interpretation seen to be common, so too there seems to be 
a perception that there is a common understanding of what dignity is, at a deep level. 
 Carozza’s explanation is one that sees the interpretation of dignity as a search for 
the universal. The universality of human rights is often thought to be central to a valid 
conception of human rights. In this, Carozza can be identiﬁ ed as aligning himself not 
only with a strong ideological position which regards human rights as normatively 
universal, but also with those in comparative law theory who see the function of com-
parative law as being to explore what is common between legal jurisdictions, even 
sometimes going so far as to view comparative law as the basis for identifying the  ‘ best ’ 
approach with the ultimate aim of securing its universal adoption. 293 He differs from 
some traditional universalists in comparative law, however, by being willing to see 
this universalist consensus not as one that is simply  found but one that is  constructed . 
In this, he appears to share some common ground with that strand of comparative 
law theory which stresses the importance of dialogue. This theorizes the compara-
tive method  ‘ as a dynamic interpretive and discursive practice ’ . 294 In the context of 
comparative constitutionalism in particular,  ‘ the dialogical approach focuses on the 
processes of constitutional interpretation.  … Comparative exchange is not bound in 
path-dependent or hierarchic ways. Rather, it poses a comity-based  “ transjudicial[] ” 
 291  Carozza,  ‘ My Friend is a Stranger: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights ’ , 81 
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 292  Ibid., at 1081 – 1082. 
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Strong Rights (2008), at 5 – 6. 
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enterprise  – a decentered view of constitutional practices deriving from pluralist 
sources, with the possibility of  “ cross fertilization ” . ’ 295 
 D   Beyond the Minimum Core? 
 In a previous part of this article (Part 3), we identiﬁ ed three elements of the minimum 
core of the concept of human dignity: the ontological claim, the relational claim, and 
the limited-state claim. We saw that there are different understandings of each of these 
elements of the concept of human dignity, reﬂ ected in the historical and textual use of 
the concept, which indicate that different conceptions of human dignity are identiﬁ able. 
This part of the article demonstrated that courts have generally conﬁ rmed that when 
judges use the concept of human dignity, they too appear to adopt the minimum core. 
We can also see that the judiciary in several jurisdictions has attempted to explore, in 
particular, the second and third elements, and to do so, in part, through a transnational 
dialogic process. As a result of this judicial activity, we can also identify more clearly 
than before the contexts in which human dignity seems likely to have most resonance 
for understanding the relational and limited-state elements in the core concept. 
 5   Finding Signiﬁ cant Differences in the Judicial Discourse on 
Human Dignity: No Consensus Beyond the Minimum Core? 
 Can we say, therefore, that we are any further advanced in identifying a common 
conception of human dignity, either in any particular jurisdiction or transnationally? 
The answer which this part of the article gives to this question is  ‘ no ’ . There are sig-
niﬁ cantly differing expressions of the relationship between human rights and dignity, 
and signiﬁ cant variations between jurisdictions in how dignity affects similar 
substantive issues. We should not, however, reject the more universalistic analysis 
of Carozza simply because there may be differences between jurisdictions at any one 
point in time. A principled interpretation of a grand principle often seems to call for 
agreement on what the effect of applying the principle is, whilst nevertheless disa-
greeing on what a full theoretical basis for the principle may be. Cass Sunstein has 
described the process of deciding cases on their facts without necessarily agreeing on 
any particular theory supporting the decision as giving rise to  ‘ incompletely theorized ’ 
agreements. Such agreements exist where individuals can agree on a speciﬁ c result, 
even if they do not agree on all the aspects of the speciﬁ c theory justifying that result. 296 
But my argument in this part of the article will be that there are such profound dif-
ferences between jurisdictions using the concept of dignity that this explanation just 
does not seem descriptively convincing. When we dig deeper, such signiﬁ cant differ-
ences appear to arise that a somewhat different story must be told. Unfortunately, per-
haps, Carozza’s preferred normative function of dignity does not seem to be supported 
by judicial practice. We shall ﬁ nd such signiﬁ cant differences in understanding dignity 
 295  Ibid., at 2586. 
 296  C.R. Sunstein,  Legal Reasoning and Political Conﬂ ict (1996). 
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that Carozza’s universalistic naturalism seems overly optimistic a description. In prac-
tice, very different outcomes are derived from the application of dignity arguments. 
This is startlingly apparent when we look at the differing role that dignity has played 
in different jurisdictions in several quite similar factual contexts: abortion, incitement 
to racial hatred, obscenity, and socio-economic rights. In each, the dignity argument 
is often to be found on both sides of the argument, and in different jurisdictions sup-
porting opposite conclusions. 
 A   Pluralism and Relativism 
 Before turning to speciﬁ cs, we can observe more generally that claims to universalism 
and naturalism in human rights discourse have proven deeply controversial, with 
some arguing that the inclusion of common principles in these texts or judicial deci-
sions merely camouﬂ ages profound disagreement on their application as well the 
theory supporting them. Lord Hoffmann, for example, has stated:  ‘ of course we share 
a common humanity.  … Nevertheless  … the speciﬁ c answers, the degree to which 
weight is given to one desirable objective rather than another, will be culturally deter-
mined. Different communities will, through their legislature and judges, adopt the 
answers which they think suit them. ’ 297 All that is left of dignity, it might be said, is the 
relatively empty shell provided by the minimum core, but when the concept comes to 
be applied the appearance of commonality disappears, and human dignity (and with 
it human rights) is exposed as culturally relative, deeply contingent on local politics 
and values, resulting in signiﬁ cantly diverging, even conﬂ icting, conceptions. Is this 
a better explanation for what is happening to the interpretation of dignity in judicial 
interpretation of human rights norms? 
 Just as Carozza’s universalistic approach has parallels with universalistic approaches 
in comparative law theory, so too this more sceptical approach has some similarities 
with pluralistic approaches to comparative law. 298 In the pluralist camp are those who 
see the function of the comparative method as being the identiﬁ cation of what is differ-
ent between jurisdictions, stressing the need for an understanding of local context and 
emphasizing the truth that, even when similar concepts are being used across jurisdic-
tions, that does not mean that the concept plays the same role in each, or that the same 
conception is in play. These debates in comparative law echo the approach in human 
rights that veers towards cultural relativism. The more  ‘ political ’ and  ‘ constitutional ’ 
the issue (and few issues are more political and constitutional than human rights), the 
more comparative lawyers tend to move to the cultural relativist end of the spectrum. 
 B   Differences in the Conceptions of Dignity in Judicial Interpretation 
 1  Weight and Status of Dignity 
 There are signiﬁ cant variations between jurisdictions on the legal status and weight 
of human dignity. Does human dignity have a status superior to that of other human 
 297  Lord Hoffmann,  ‘ Human Rights and the House of Lords ’ , 62  MLR (1999) 159, at 165. 
 298  This has close similarities with what Tushnet terms  ‘ expressivism ’ :  ‘ [e]xpressivism takes constitutional 
ideas to be expressions of a particular nation’s self-understanding ’ : Tushnet,  supra note 293, at 5. 
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rights (as in Germany generally, 299 and in Hungary when combined with the right 
to life 300 ), in the sense that it is the highest constitutional principle, subject neither 
to other rights, nor to other values? Thus, in Germany,  ‘ human dignity has an abso-
lute effect. There is, according to the jurisprudence of the courts, no way to balance 
other legal interests, be they of other individuals or of the community, with the dig-
nity of a person. The principle of proportionality does not come into play as long as 
an intrusion upon human dignity has been established. ’ 301 Or, in contrast, is dignity 
less important in the hierarchy of human rights and not superior to other rights, as 
Kriegler J appears to say in the South African  Makwanyane case, 302 and is subject to the 
same types of limitations that apply to other rights, as in Hungary (when dignity is not 
combined with the right to life), 303 and in Israel, where human dignity  ‘ may be limited 
so as to accommodate other interests and rights ’ ? 304 The French  Conseil Constitutionnel 
in the  Abortion Decision of 2001 decided that, although dignity may be a constitution-
ally protected principle, dignity is not an inviolable or a supreme principle. The  Con-
seil Constitutionnel ’ s willingness to balance dignity against the freedom of the women 
demonstrates that dignity, in France, is not inviolable or accorded higher status than 
other constitutionally protected principles or rights. 
 2   Individualistic Versus Communitarian Conceptions of Dignity 
 We saw when considering the emergence of dignity historically that an important 
distinction could be identiﬁ ed between the use of dignity to express a communitar-
ian ideal and one that was much more focussed on the role of dignity in furthering 
individual autonomy, in the sense of advancing individual liberty based upon the 
choice of the individual. This difference in approach is also reﬂ ected in the different 
approaches which courts adopt. In brief, the German Constitutional Court adopts a 
more communitarian approach, whilst the predominant approach to dignity in the 
US Supreme Court, the Canadian Supreme Court, and the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court is more individualistic. The South African Constitutional Court appears to be 
signiﬁ cantly split on the issue. 
 The reasoning of the German Constitutional Court’s judgment in the  Lifetime Impris-
onment Case illustrates well a more communitarian approach:  ‘ [t]he constitutional 
principles of the Basic Law embrace the respect and protection of human dignity. The 
free person and his dignity are the highest values of the constitutional order. The state 
 299  D. Kommers,  The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2nd edn, 1997), at 32. 
 300  Death Penalty Case ,  supra note 230. 
 301  Klein,  supra note 174, at 149. But see  infra , text at notes 391 – 404. 
 302  Makwanyane,  supra note 231, at para. 214:  ‘ in the hierarchy of values and fundamental rights guar-
anteed [by the Interim Constitution], I see [human dignity,  inter alia ] as ranking below the right to life. 
Indeed, [it is] subsumed by that most basic of rights. ’ 
 303  Dupré,  ‘ The Right to Human Dignity in Hungarian Constitutional Case-law ’ , in European Commission 
for Democracy through Law,  supra note 14, at 72; C. Dupré,  Importing the Law in Post-Communist Tradi-
tions: The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity (2003), at 108, 111. 
 304  Kretzmer,  supra note 210, at 169. 
 700     EJIL  19 (2008),  655 – 724 
in all of its forms is obliged to respect and defend it. This is based on the conception of 
man as a spiritual-moral being endowed with the freedom to determine and develop 
himself.  This freedom within the meaning of the Basic Law is not that of an isolated and 
self-regarding individual but rather of a person related to and bound by the community . In 
the light of this community-boundedness it cannot be  “ in principle unlimited ” .  The 
individual must allow those limits on his freedom of action that the legislature deems neces-
sary in the interest of the community’s social life; yet the autonomy of the individual has 
to be protected. ’ 305 
 Despite the fact that Hungary has borrowed so extensively from Germany, Dupré 
has argued that the importation of dignity has resulted in  ‘ the development of a very 
different picture of the human person in Hungarian case law ’ , one where the per-
son is envisaged as someone  ‘ considered in isolation and ﬁ ghting against the state 
to protect her rights ’ . 306 In Hungary,  ‘ human dignity is focused on individuality and 
autonomy ’ . 307 The Court’s approach, at least up to 1998, was one in which  ‘ human 
dignity is limited to the individual considered in his singularity. It empowers the indi-
vidual to take control over his life without any interference, or indeed any help, from 
others or from the state. Human dignity  … does not essentially facilitate interaction 
and relationships between people. Instead, human dignity surrounds the individual in 
a sort of protective sphere, and thus isolates individuals from each other. ’ 308 The  Casey 
and  Lawrence cases, considered previously, illustrate a similar individualistic approach 
adopted in the US Supreme Court. Another example, in a different context, is to be 
found in  Rice v Cayetano , where Kennedy J held that an afﬁ rmative action measure, 
using classiﬁ cations based on race, was unconstitutional because  ‘ it demeans the dig-
nity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit 
and essential qualities ’ . 309 
 These differences in approach are particularly important in the context of socio-
economic rights, where the crucial question is how far, if at all, the state is under a 
positive duty to safeguard human dignity. We saw earlier that, in South Africa, socio-
economic rights are regarded judicially as  ‘ rooted in respect for human dignity ’ . 310 
In Poland, in the context of unemployment, human dignity requires that the state 
 ‘ ensure that individuals out of work are able to exercise their rights to existence and 
to freedom ’ and the Constitutional Tribunal has held, therefore, that  ‘ social security 
beneﬁ ts guaranteed to the unemployed by the state should at least guarantee them a 
basic level of social welfare ’ . 311 In Germany, the Constitutional Court initially  ‘ refused 
 305  Kommers,  supra note 299, at 307 – 308 (emphasis added). 
 306  Dupré,  Importing the Law, supra note 303, at 122. 
 307  Ibid., at 123. 
 308  Ibid., at 125. 
 309  Contrast approaches in India and South Africa, where afﬁ rmative action is regarded as a major 
method of fulﬁ lling dignity:  Thakur v. Union of India [2007] RD-SC 609 (17 May 2007), at para. 174 
(per Balakrishnan, CJ) (Sup Ct India);  Minister of Finance v. Van Heerden , 2004 (11) BCLR 1125, at para. 25. 
 310  Corder,  supra note 28, at 117, quoting Chaskalson,  supra note 252, at 204. 
 311  Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska,  supra note 211, at 21. 
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to derive [from human dignity] an individual right to public welfare, [and then] left 
the question explicitly open ’ . 312 More recently, that Court has held that human dig-
nity, in combination with other constitutional principles,  ‘ imposes an obligation on 
the state to provide at least minimal subsistence to every individual ’ . 313 In Italy, the 
Constitutional Court has  ‘ “ discovered ” that human dignity requires that decent hous-
ing be secured for all citizens as a constitutional  “ social right ” ’ . 314 
 In Hungary, on the other hand, human dignity  ‘ does not serve as a basis for recog-
nizing social rights ’ . 315 Rather, it served as the basis for questioning and reinterpreting 
the scope of social rights enacted under the Communist regime, 316 allowing a switch 
to be made to a more economically liberal, individualistic conception of rights. In 
Israel, whilst the Basic Law has been interpreted as generating some socio-economic 
rights, these encompass only the most minimal material conditions necessary to exist: 
sufﬁ cient sustenance, a place of residence adequate to protect privacy and family life, 
adequate sanitary conditions, and basic medical services. 317 In the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s decision in  Gosselin , 318 a highly individualistic approach was taken by the 
Chief Justice. The issue was whether a provincial workfare scheme which provided 
social beneﬁ ts below the poverty line for those aged below 30 was unconstitutional, 
particularly on grounds of age discrimination. As we have seen, in the Canadian con-
text part of the test of what constitutes discrimination depends on whether the indi-
vidual’s dignity has been damaged. The majority of the Court held that there was no 
discrimination. The Chief Justice held that it was not discriminatory in part because 
there was no breach of the individual’s dignity; rather, the reverse:  ‘ [t]he evidence 
shows that the regime set up under the Social Aid Act sought to promote the self-
sufﬁ ciency and autonomy of young welfare recipients through their integration into 
the productive work force, and to combat the pernicious side effects of unemployment 
and welfare dependency. The participation incentive worked towards the realization 
of goals that go to the heart of the equality guarantee: self-determination, personal 
autonomy, self-respect, feelings of self-worth, and empowerment. These are the stuff 
and substance of essential human dignity. ’ 319 
 312  Walter,  supra note 71, at 29. Similarly in Belgium see Court of Arbitration, judgment No. 66/97 of 6 Nov. 
1997, quoted in Delpérée,  ‘ The Right to Human Dignity in Belgian Constitutional Law ’ , in European 
Commission for Democracy through Law,  supra note 14, at 57, 62. 
 313  Bognetti,  supra note 28, at 75, 83. See further 99 BverfGE 246. See also Starck,  ‘ The Religious and Philo-
sophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein, 
 supra note 4, at 179,189. 
 314  Bognetti,  supra note 28, at 75, 85. 
 315  Dupré,  ‘ The Right to Human Dignity ’ ,  supra note 303, at 68, 69. 
 316  Dupré, Importing the Law,  supra note 303, at 146 – 147. 
 317  HCJ 888, 366/03,  Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Association v. Minister of Finance (decision of 12 
Dec. 2005). See further Barak-Erez and Gross,  ‘ Social Citizenship: The Neglected Aspect of Israeli Consti-
tutional Law ’ , in Barak-Erez and Gross,  supra note 279, at 242, especially 244 – 252. 
 318  Gosselin v. Quebec, 2002 SCC 84 (Sup Ct Canada). 
 319  Ibid., at para. 65. 
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 3   Dignity as Rights-supporting, or Rights-constraining? 
 This discussion leads into the identiﬁ cation of another difference between jurisdictions 
in the role that dignity plays. We saw earlier that dignity has been viewed as a prin-
cipled basis of support for the human rights enterprise. In practice, however, dignity 
has come to be used as a major constraint on (some) rights. This can arise because 
dignity is used by both sides of a dispute to support their particular rights claims. In 
the  Pretty case, involving the  ‘ right to die ’ , the ECtHR, according to Susan Millns, has 
adopted the view that that  ‘ the dignity of humanity expressed in its most universal 
and objective form so as to protect life is given force over and above the individual 
and subjective dignity of the person seeking assistance to terminate a state of personal 
suffering ’ . 320 Increasingly, the rhetoric of dignity is used to support restrictions on civil 
liberties as part of the  ‘ war on terrorism ’ , using the argument that the state has a duty 
to protect the dignity of individuals who will be adversely affected by such terrorism. 
As early as 1988, the Preamble to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, with Related Protocol, 1988, referred 
to the  ‘ world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms, which endanger or 
take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms and seriously impair the 
dignity of human beings ’ . 321 Since then, the use of dignity language in this context has 
increased signiﬁ cantly. 322 
 Dignity sometimes functions as a justiﬁ cation for limiting the protection of rights 
or obligations, like a public order or public morals exception, allowing the state to 
place limits on what particular rights would otherwise require. In the Israeli context, 
human dignity has been developed not only as a basis for rights but also as a con-
straint on rights, leading to decisions in which pornographic ﬁ lms could legitimately 
be censored where they were regarded as degrading to human dignity, especially the 
dignity of women. When the Film Censorship Board insisted on the deletion of scenes 
it considered degrading to women, the Supreme Court of Israel, in  Station Film Co. v. 
Public Council for Film Censorship , 323 expressly recognized that the artistic value of the 
ﬁ lm had to be weighed against the need to protect human dignity. 324 In another case, 
the Court held that racism is an affront to human dignity, and speech which promotes 
racial hatred can thus legitimately be prohibited. 325 Indeed, these two areas where 
 320  Millns,  ‘ Death, Dignity and Discrimination: The Case of Pretty v. United Kingdom ’ , 3(10)  German LJ 
(2002), available at:  www.germanlawjournal.com , at para. 8. 
 321  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678 UNTS 
221, 27 ILM (1988) 668. 
 322  President George W. Bush in his 2005 speech to the UN spoke of how it was necessary, in the context of 
countering terrorism  ‘ to raise up the failing states and stagnant societies that provide fertile ground for 
the terrorists. We must defend and extend a vision of human dignity, and opportunity, and prosperity 
 … ’ . 
 323  Station Film Co. v. Public Council for Film Censorship (1994) 50 PD (5) 661. 
 324  Kretzmer,  supra note 210, at 169. 
 325  Ibid . Cp. US – Federal Republic of Germany Agreement on Cultural Property, 1986, sect. 130 prohibited 
 ‘ assail[ing] the human dignity of others ’  ‘ in a manner likely to disturb the public peace ’ by, e.g., provok-
ing hatred against sections of the population, or vilifying, maliciously disparaging, or defaming them. 
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free speech principles come into conﬂ ict with the interests of others have proven a rich 
ground for conﬂ ict over the appropriate role for dignity arguments in several jurisdic-
tions. 
 In the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in  R. v. Labaye , 326 the judgment of the major-
ity, delivered by McLachlin CJ, considered a conviction for keeping a  ‘ common bawdy-
house ’ for the  ‘ practice of acts of indecency ’ . The issue was whether the acts committed 
in this establishment were acts of indecency. The Court drew on the idea of human dig-
nity as part of its assessment of what  ‘ indecency ’ involved:  ‘ [c]onduct or material that 
perpetuates negative and demeaning images of humanity is likely to undermine respect 
for members of the targeted groups and hence to predispose others to act in an anti-
social manner towards them. Such conduct may violate formally recognized societal 
norms, like the equality and dignity of all human beings. ’ 327 In  De Reuck v. Director of 
Public Prosecutions , 328 the Constitutional Court of South Africa considered whether the 
conviction of a ﬁ lm producer under a criminal provision relating to child pornography 
was unconstitutional. The decision by Langa DCJ for the Court considered the objective 
of the legislation:  ‘ [t]he purpose of the legislation is to curb child pornography, which is 
seen as an evil in all democratic societies. Child pornography is universally condemned 
for good reason. It strikes at the dignity of children. ’ 329 In deciding to uphold the legisla-
tion, Langa J continued,  ‘ Children’s dignity rights are of special importance. The deg-
radation of children through child pornography is a serious harm which impairs their 
dignity and contributes to a culture which devalues their worth. ’ 330 
 So too, the area of incitement to racial and other forms of group hatred has given 
rise to a similar use of dignity arguments. In  Faurisson v. France 331 the concurring 
opinion of Prafullachandra Bhagwati in the Human Rights Committee emphasized 
that the restrictions in French law relating to denial of the holocaust (the Gayssot 
Act) were justiﬁ ed in part on the basis that the restrictions upheld human dignity. The 
restriction on the author’s freedom of expression imposed under the Gayssot Act was 
necessary for respect of the rights and interests of the Jewish community.  ‘ [T]he neces-
sary consequence and fall-out of such statements would have been, in the context of 
the situation prevailing in Europe, promotion and strengthening of anti-semitic feel-
ings  … . Therefore, the imposition of a restriction by the Gayssot Act was necessary for 
securing respect for the rights and interests of the Jewish community to live in society 
with full human dignity and free from an atmosphere of anti-semitism. ’ 332 
 A very similar approach has been taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in  Kreeg-
stra . 333 Dickson CJ, for the majority, explained how, in his view, hate propaganda was 
 326  2005 SCC 80 (Sup Ct Canada). 
 327  Ibid., at para. 46. 
 328  2004 (1) SA 406 (Const Ct S Africa). 
 329  Ibid., at para. 61. 
 330  Ibid., at para. 63. 
 331  Communication 550/1993, (1996) 2 BHRC, UN HR Committee. 
 332  Individual opinion by Prafullachandra Bhagwati. 
 333  [1990] 3 SCR 697 (Sup Ct Canada). 
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contrary to human dignity.  ‘ A person’s sense of human dignity and belonging to the 
community at large is closely linked to the concern and respect accorded the groups 
to which he or she belongs  … . The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate 
propaganda therefore have a severely negative impact on the individual’s sense of 
self-worth and acceptance.  … Such consequences bear heavily in a nation that prides 
itself on tolerance and the fostering of human dignity through, among other things, 
respect for the many racial, religious and cultural groups in our society. ’ 334 So, too, 
McLachlin J, dissenting, agreed that hate speech implicated the dignity of the targeted 
group:  ‘ [t]he evil of hate propaganda is beyond doubt. It inﬂ icts pain and indignity 
upon individuals who are members of the group in question. ’ 335 The Hungarian and 
South African Constitutional Courts have also adopted a very similar approach. 336 
 The point of these examples is to emphasize the highly contested nature of the type of 
arguments which dignity is used to support. In the free speech context, this approach 
would ﬁ nd no support in the US Supreme Court, for example, where the judicial 
approach to the status of freedom of expression would be sure to lead, for example, to 
the explicit rejection of these decisions. It is noteworthy that, to my knowledge, such 
arguments based on dignity have not even been attempted in that court, undoubtedly 
because they would be doomed to fail. 
 So, too, dignity has come to be seen as equally controversial in the equality context. 
Several commentators have argued that the Canadian Supreme Court has effectively 
incorporated an additional barrier that applicants must surmount; that the indi-
vidual or the group with which the victim identiﬁ es or is identiﬁ ed has been subject 
to discrimination of such a type that dignity has been under attack. Dignity has 
enabled courts to build limits into the reach and depth of the equality principle, limit-
ing both the group of  ‘ victims ’ who may legitimately claim and the distributive justice 
implications of the equality principle. Although this approach has been the subject of 
much supportive academic comment, 337 attempts to establish the utility of dignity as 
a foundational norm for equality at other than the rhetorical level have also provoked 
a wave of criticism. 338 Grabham offers some support for the view that the Canadian 
approach limits the opportunity to base equality arguments on distributive justice in 
her interpretation of the limited approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court to the 
interpretation of human dignity under the Canadian Charter. For some the divorce of 
anti-discrimination law from distributive justice in this way is desirable. Indeed, dig-
nity is regarded as desirable precisely because it provides an alternative rationale to 
distributive justice in the equality context. Such an approach, Réaume maintains, can 
 334  Ibid., at 746. 
 335  Ibid., at 812. See also  Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights Commission [1990] 3 SCR 892 (Sup Ct Canada, 
Dickson CJ). 
 336  Decision 30/1992 (V. 26.) AB, Constitutional Court ﬁ le number: 1358/B/1991, published in the Ofﬁ cial 
Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) MK 1992/53 (Hungarian Const Ct). See also  Islamic Unity Convention v. Inde-
pendent Broadcasting Authority , 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (Const Ct). 
 337  Mendes,  supra note 251, at 3. 
 338  Gibbins,  ‘ How in the World Can You Contest Equal Human Dignity? ’ , 12  Nat’l J Const L (2000) 25. 
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explain many of the advances in modern anti-discrimination law without resorting 
to end-state distributive principles. 339 For others, however, this is anathema. Post has 
picked up the potential limits which dignity arguments may introduce, and argues 
that modern American anti-discrimination law should not be conceived, as is com-
monly supposed, as protecting the dignity of individuals but, rather, as attempting to 
transform social practices which deﬁ ne and sustain potentially oppressive categories 
such as race or gender. 340 This is not to argue that grounding the anti-discrimination 
principle in distributive justice is uncontroversial; simply that the Canadian approach, 
grounding it in dignity, has not escaped fundamental criticisms and remains a con-
tested strategy. Indeed, it is interesting that the Canadian Supreme Court (long the 
main proponent of the use of dignity in the equality context) has in its most recent case 
sharply moved away from dignity language, recognizing that: 
 several difﬁ culties have arisen from the attempt  … to employ human dignity  as a legal test .  … 
[A]s critics have pointed out, human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that, even 
with the guidance of the four contextual factors, cannot only become confusing and difﬁ cult 
to apply; it has also proven to be an  additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the 
philosophical enhancement it was intended to be. 341 
 4   Waiving Dignity? 
 How far, if at all, can dignity be waived by an individual? Where a choice-based auto-
nomy approach to dignity is adopted, then it would seem strange to think that it can-
not be waived by the person whose dignity is supposedly in issue. To do otherwise 
smacks of paternalism. On the other hand, a more communitarian approach to dig-
nity seems potentially compatible with not being permitted to waive dignity. We are 
used in some contexts to viewing certain rights as not at the disposal of the individual, 
for example the right not to be enslaved cannot be waived. 
 In Germany, the Constitutional Court has held that  ‘ human dignity means not 
only the individual dignity of the person but the dignity of man as a species. Dignity is 
therefore not at the disposal of the individual. ’ 342 The obligation on the state to protect 
human dignity may justify limiting the rights of the person whom the state seeks to 
protect, irrespective of the preferences of the individual. 343 The Federal Administrative 
Court, for example, has held that the dignity of women who work in  ‘ peep-shows ’ , 
exposing themselves to men for payment, is violated and they can legitimately be pro-
hibited from doing so. 344 A prohibition on dwarf throwing, as part of a commercial 
 339  Réaume,  supra note 243, at 650. 
 340  Post,  ‘ Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law ’ , 88  California L Rev 
(2000) 1. 
 341  R. v Kapp , 2008 SCC 41, at paras 22 – 23 (McLachlin CJ and Abella J (Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, 
Charron, and Rothstein JJ concurring). 
 342  Klein,  supra note 175, at 148. 
 343  Ibid., at 157 – 159. 
 344  BverfGE 64, 274, at 279 – 280. Although Klein,  supra note 175, at 158, notes that in a subsequent deci-
sion this approach was not adopted. 
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entertainment, by a local authority in France was upheld by both the  Conseil d ’ État 345 
and, subsequently, the Human Rights Committee on the ground that the restriction 
was justiﬁ ed on the basis of human dignity. 346 
 In Canada, the position seems more ambiguous. Consent may be relevant but is  ‘ not 
determinative ’ . In the  Butler case, 347 from which this approach derives, the issue was 
the constitutionality of restrictions on pornographic material. Sopinka J concluded, 
 ‘ Among other things, degrading or dehumanizing materials place women (and some-
times men) in positions of subordination, servile submission or humiliation. They run 
against the principles of equality and dignity of all human beings. In the apprecia-
tion of whether material is degrading or dehumanizing, the appearance of consent is 
not  necessarily determinative. Consent cannot save materials that otherwise contain 
degrading or dehumanizing scenes. Sometimes the very appearance of consent makes 
the depicted acts even more degrading or dehumanizing. ’ 348 In South Africa, the posi-
tion is, again, ambiguous and context-dependent. Whilst a strongly anti-paternalist 
approach is adopted, as we have seen in the context of the gay rights cases discussed 
earlier, a very different approach is adopted in the case of prostitution. In the  Jordan 
case, 349 the Constitutional Court upheld the criminalization of prostitution. The justiﬁ -
cation offered by O’Regan and Sachs JJ seems out of keeping with their earlier strongly 
autonomy-based approach in the gay rights cases:  ‘ [t]he very nature of prostitution is 
the commodiﬁ cation of one’s body. Even though we accept that prostitutes may have 
few alternatives to prostitution, the dignity of prostitutes is diminished  … by their 
engaging in commercial sex work. The very character of the work they undertake 
devalues the respect that the Constitution regards as inherent in the human body. ’ 350 
 5   Dignity, From Whose Point of View? 
 Jurisdictions also differ, therefore, on whether dignity is to be interpreted from the 
point of view of the victim or  ‘ objectively ’ . One can sympathize with the difﬁ culty 
courts have in this context. On the one hand, for the court to say that the appropri-
ate approach is to adopt a particular individual’s own judgement on what seems to 
breach his or her dignity is to risk putting in place an unmanageable and unwork-
able standard. On the other hand, adopting an entirely court-centred view of what 
constitutes a breach of dignity seems patronizing. In Poland, both the subjective feelings 
of the person seeking legal protection and the objective reactions to those claims are 
taken into account. 351 In Canada, the approach taken also seems to indicate that the 
courts want to have it both ways. In  Halpern v. Attorney General , 352 the Court of Appeal 
 345  Conseil d’Etat, 27 Oct. 1995, req. Nos 136 – 720 (Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge), and 143 – 578 (Ville 
d’Aix-en-Provence). 
 346  Wackenheim v. France , CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999: France, 26 July 2002, at para. 7.4. 
 347  R. v. Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452 (Sup Ct Canada). 
 348  Ibid., at 479 (emphasis added). 
 349  Jordan v. The State , 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
 350  Ibid., at para. 74. 
 351  Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska,  supra note 211, at 24. 
 352  2003 65 OR (3d) 161 (CA Ontario). 
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for Ontario summed up the Canadian approach thus:  ‘ [t]he assessment of whether 
a law has the effect of demeaning a claimant’s dignity should be undertaken from a 
subjective-objective perspective. The relevant point of view is not solely that of a  “ rea-
sonable person ” , but that of a  “ reasonable person, dispassionate and fully apprised 
of the circumstances, possessed of similar attributes to, and under similar circum-
stances as, the group of which the rights claimant is a member ”  … . This requires a 
court to consider the individual’s or group’s traits, history, and circumstances in order 
to evaluate whether a reasonable person, in circumstances similar to the claimant, 
would ﬁ nd that the impugned law differentiates in a manner which demeans his or 
her dignity. ’ 353 Whilst it is understandable that a court would want to have it both 
ways, this hardly seems a particularly stable approach, and in practice has sometimes 
led to courts adopting what seems like an almost entirely objective approach, where 
the court effectively imposes its own views, as in the  Gosselin case, discussed earlier. 
 6   Who Should Judge Dignity Claims? 
 An even more radical difference between jurisdictions can be identiﬁ ed. Who should 
make the decision whether dignity should be accorded to a particular entity, and who 
should decide whether the balance between dignity and other values is appropriate? 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court did not consider that the right to human dig-
nity would limit abortion in ways equivalent to those found by the German Court 
unless  Parliament had recognized the foetus as a human person. 354 In the French  Con-
seil Constitutionel’s Abortion Decision , referred to above, the constitutionality of three 
amendments liberalizing French abortion law was challenged. One amendment in 
particular, which widened the permissible window for abortions from 10 to 12 weeks 
where the woman was in distress, was challenged as violating the  ‘ principle of safe-
guard of human dignity against any form of deterioration ’ 355 because of the risk of 
resulting eugenic practices. Deciding that the amendments were constitutional, the 
Court stated that the new 12-week limit had not upset the  ‘ balance that the Constitu-
tion requires between safeguarding human dignity  … and the freedom of women ’ . 356 
The  Conseil Constitutionel explained that it is not for the court to decide the appropriate 
balance between the freedom of the woman and the dignity of the foetus: that is the 
exclusive province of the legislature. In other words, the opinion implies that the job 
of the court is merely to ensure that the legislature is balancing, not to police how it 
is balancing. 
 7   Who, or What, Is Protected By a Claim to Human Dignity? 
 We have seen that what I termed the ontological claim is central to the minimum core 
of the concept of human dignity. How have courts treated this aspect of the concept? 
Does human dignity apply only to a live, sentient person? Apparently not, at least in 
some jurisdictions. In Israel, dignity attaches to those who have died, as well as to the 
 353  Ibid., at para. 79. 
 354  Dupré,  Importing the Law, supra note 303, at 116. 
 355  Decision 2001-446 DC of 27 June 2001, at para. 2. 
 356  Ibid., at para. 5. 
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living. 357 In Germany, human dignity may also protect the dead, or at least their repu-
tation. 358 In Hungary, the Constitutional Court has gone one stage further and  ‘ seems 
to recognize  … that certain legal entities can  … enjoy the right to dignity, which is 
no longer regarded as an exclusively human quality therefore ’ . 359 The Supreme Court 
of Israel seems to have gone one step further still. In  Let the Animals Live v. Hamat 
Gader Spa Village , 360 an organization concerned with the welfare of animals sought 
to ban the practice of  ‘ alligator – man ﬁ ghts ’ , presented for the beneﬁ t of visitors. The 
 ‘ alligator – man ﬁ ghts ’ included a series of acts inﬂ icted by the human on the alliga-
tor, including tumbling the alligator by grabbing its tail, forcibly opening its jaws, pulling 
the alligator’s head backwards, pulling its back legs, turning it on its back, and press-
ing its lower jaw. The animal welfare organization argued that the show abused the 
alligators and caused them suffering and should therefore be stopped. Cheshin J inter-
preted the relevant provisions of the Protection of Animals Act 1994 as prohibiting 
any kind of conscious abuse of animals unless it could be justiﬁ ed, whether that abuse 
was severe or mild, physical or mental, and he rejected the lower court’s interpretation 
of the provision as prohibiting only abuse that caused the animal extreme suffering. 
The purpose of the shows, presented exclusively for entertainment, did not constitute 
an appropriate aim that might justify the suffering inﬂ icted on the alligators.  ‘ I ﬁ nd no 
justiﬁ cation for inﬂ icting pain and anguish on a helpless animal solely for the purpose 
of entertaining an audience. Such an act is simply immoral and we should not allow 
it.  The animal is a helpless creature, much like a helpless minor. Neither of them can 
protect themselves, or claim their insult, or regain their dignity . ’ 361 Cheshin J consid-
ered that the show might cause humiliation for the alligators:  ‘ I shall add, with the 
required caution, that this ﬁ ght show not only causes the alligator suffering, but also 
leads to its humiliation. This is not to be taken lightly. I do not know if the alliga-
tor itself feels humiliated when the human wrestler hold its tail, tumbles it back and 
forth, turns it on its back, and so forth, as if it were a lifeless rag doll. However, this I 
know  – that the acts inﬂ icted by man on alligator, were they to be inﬂ icted on man, 
would be considered humiliating and oppressing. ’ 362 
 The greatest unresolved difference between jurisdictions over the application of 
human dignity arises, however, over the question whether a human foetus has dig-
nity. It is clear that the foetus is under the protection of human dignity in Germany. 
 357  Shavit v. Rishon Lezion Jewish Burial Society , CA 6024/97 (Sup Ct Israel sitting as the Court of Appeals, 
1 July 1999) referring to the  ‘ human dignity of the deceased ’ . See further Kretzmer,  supra note 210, at 
168. 
 358  Mephisto case , BverfGE 30, 173; Kommers,  supra note 299, at 301. 
 359  Dupré,  supra note 303, at 72; Dupré,  Importing the Law, supra note 303, at 112 – 113. 
 360  1648/96,  Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Spa Village Inc (1997). I am grateful to Tamar Feldman for 
providing a translation of the key parts of the judgment. According to reports in the scientiﬁ c press, a 
2004 Swiss law was interpreted to prevent particular experiments on animals on the ground that the ex-
periments offended the dignity of the non-human primates involved: see Abbott,  ‘ Swiss court bans work 
on macaque brains ’ , 453  Nature (2008) 833. 
 361  Ibid., at para. 41 (emphasis added). 
 362  Ibid. 
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In the context of abortion, the German Constitutional Court  ‘ used the human dignity 
clause to underline the constitutional requirement for protection of unborn life ’ . 363 
According to the  First Abortion Decision of the German Constitutional Court,  ‘ develop-
ing life also enjoys the protection which Article 1(1) accords to the dignity of man. 
Wherever human life exists it merits human dignity; whether the subject of this dig-
nity is conscious of it and knows how to safeguard it is not of decisive moment. The 
potential capabilities inherent in human existence from its inception are adequate to 
establish human dignity. ’ 364 The important point is that this and other decisions reject 
attaching human dignity only to those with the present capacity to make autono-
mous decisions. In the United States, there is no mention of the  ‘ dignity ’ of the foetus 
until, in  Gonzales v. Carhart , 365 Kennedy J giving the opinion of the Court, described 
the rationale for the prohibited (so-called  ‘ partial birth ’ ) abortion procedure at issue in 
that case as  ‘ express[ing] respect for the dignity of human life ’ . 366 In the ECtHR, even 
after 30 years of litigation, it is still uncertain whether dignity applies to the foetus 
and, if not, why not. In  Tysiac v. Poland , 367 the dissenting opinion of Judge Borrego 
regarded dignity as directly engaged, but the Court did not take up this challenge. 
 In Hungary, as we saw above, the Hungarian Constitutional Court did not con-
sider that the right to human dignity would limit abortion in ways equivalent to those 
found by the German court, unless Parliament had recognized the foetus as a human 
person. 368 The dissenting opinion by Judge Lábady, however, regarded the issue as one 
to be decided by the Court, and not left to Parliament:  ‘ [a]ccording to Article 54 para. 
(1) of the Constitution in the Republic of Hungary every human being has the inher-
ent right to life and to human dignity of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived. 
In the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the right to life and human dignity 
is an absolute subjective right, i.e. it cannot be restricted and reduced, since it is a 
fundamental right which must be left intact by the law. Since in a biological sense, 
the foetus is a human, i.e. a genetically fully developed individual human being, and 
since the term  “ inherent right to life ” means  … a right not gained through birth, but 
one  “ formed ” together with the man, i.e. a right that originates in the existence, the 
humanity of the man, the lack of human dignity and having no right to life cannot be 
justiﬁ ed by the Constitution in case of a foetus not yet born. ’ 369 Dupré writes that the 
decision of the majority is in  ‘ stark contrast ’ to the approach adopted in Germany, 370 
and that the  ‘ gap between the two interpretations of human dignity appears to be 
 363  Walter,  supra note 71, at 28. 
 364  Abortion Case , 39 BverfGE R 1 (1975); D.P. Kommers,  The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (2nd edn, 1997). at 338. This was conﬁ rmed in the  Second Abortion decision: BverGE 88, 
208 (1993). 
 365  127 S Ct 1610; 167 L Ed 2d 480 (2007) (US Sup Ct). 
 366  Ibid., at Part IV.A. of the decision. 
 367  45 EHRR (2007) 42, dissenting opinion of Judge Borrego Borrego, at para. 15. 
 368  Dupré,  Importing the Law, supra note 303, at 116. 
 369  Decision 48/1998 (IX.23) AB, dissenting opinion by Dr Tamás Lábady, at para. 1. 
 370  Dupré,  Importing the Law, supra note 303, at 116. 
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even wider because it originates from constitutional provisions which are very simi-
lar, as well as from legal issues expressed in very similar terms ’ . 371 
 D   Does Dignity Serve as the Basis for a Consensual Substantive 
Conception of Human Rights? 
 The apparently common recognition of the worth of the human person as a funda-
mental principle to which the positive law should be accountable considered in Part 3 
of this article seems to camouﬂ age the use of dignity in human rights adjudication to 
incorporate signiﬁ cantly different theoretical conceptions of the meaning and impli-
cations of such worth, enabling the incorporation of just the type of ideological, reli-
gious, and cultural differences that a common theory of human rights would need 
to transcend. By its very openness and non-speciﬁ city, by its manipulability, by its 
appearance of universality disguising the extent to which cultural context is deter-
mining its meaning, dignity has enabled East and West, capitalist and non-capitalist, 
religious and anti-religious to agree (at least superﬁ cially) on a common concept. But 
this success should not blind us to the fact that where dignity is used either as an inter-
pretive principle or as the basis for speciﬁ c norms, the appearance of commonality 
and universality dissolves on closer scrutiny, and signiﬁ cantly different conceptions 
of dignity emerge. 
 Few courts acknowledge that the conception of human dignity that they apply is dif-
ferent from that applied in other countries. Indeed, to do so would appear to undermine 
a legitimizing function of human dignity. A possibly signiﬁ cant breach in the dyke has 
now appeared, however. In the  Omega case, the ECJ seems to have accepted that human 
dignity  has potentially signiﬁ cantly different meanings from country to country. The 
German authorities had prohibited Omega, a commercial enterprise, from operating a 
laserdrome where players try to  ‘ kill ’ other players by ﬁ ring a laser beam at a sensory tag 
placed on their jackets. The company argued that because the game was lawful in other 
Member States, Community law required that it be allowed in Germany on the basis 
that Community law protected the freedom to provide services in the Community. The 
German government argued that the prohibition was justiﬁ ed on the same grounds on 
which peepshows and dwarf throwing were prohibited, namely on grounds of human 
dignity. The company argued in rebuttal that a restrictive measure based on the protec-
tion of fundamental rights must be based on a  common conception of those fundamental 
rights under European Community law across the Community. The ECJ disagreed; it 
was not indispensable for the restrictive measure adopted by a Member State to corre-
spond to a conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which 
the fundamental right or interest was to be protected. 372 By implication, the German 
approach to dignity was not a conception of dignity common to the Member States. 373 
 371  Ibid., at 117. 
 372  Omega ,  supra note 199, at paras 34 – 37. For commentary on the case see M.K. Bulterman and H.R. 
Kranenborg,  ‘ Case Comment ’ , 31  European L Rev (2006) 93; Ackermann, Comment, 42  CML Rev (2005) 
1107. 
 373  See also Case C – 244/06,  Dynamic Medien v. Avides Media, not yet reported. 
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 We need to be careful, however, not to claim too much. There are several reasons 
to be cautious about drawing a conclusion that there is a lack of consensus on a par-
ticular conception of human dignity based on the evidence presented in this part of 
the article. First, much of the evidence supporting the divergence thesis (as it might 
be called) is taken from a limited range of jurisdictions, mostly at the domestic level. 
Secondly, it is arguable that I have put the bar too high in judging whether there is a 
judicial consensus on a common conception of dignity beyond the minimum core. 374 
 Basing a strong divergence thesis on this (mostly) domestic material may be prob-
lematic because, as we have seen already, different jurisdictions incorporate the idea 
of human dignity into their legal texts in different ways, using different legal instru-
ments. It may be unsurprising, therefore, if judges in different jurisdictions say differ-
ent things about, for example, the weight or status of dignity if they are dealing with 
differently constituted texts which say different things about weight and status. Judi-
cial differences may be attributable, in other words, to the texts, rather than to judicial 
interpretation. Clearly, it would be more telling at the interpretive level if there were 
examples of judges in different jurisdictions working with the  same text but coming up 
with quite different interpretations. The examples I have used do not clearly do that. 
Instead, the examples are drawn from jurisdictions which seem to have  comparable 
texts, but comparability is a matter of judgement, a judgement with which readers 
may reasonably disagree. 
 Have I put the bar on consensus too high? Using my approach, would consensus 
ever be achievable? Unanimity is unlikely ever to be achieved across all jurisdictions. 
Arguably, all I have done is to provide examples of judicial outliers. Germany says it is 
giving absolute weight to dignity when no one else does. The United States refuses to 
limit freedom of expression for the sake of the dignity of disadvantaged groups. Israel 
apparently uses the concept of dignity to protect alligators. These may all simply be 
examples of judicial outliers rather than illustrations of an absence of consensus. A 
related argument against my position is that the cases I use to illustrate the divergence 
thesis are all what Ronald Dworkin calls  ‘ hard cases ’ , 375 in which one might  expect to 
ﬁ nd signiﬁ cant divergence. Divergent results in hard cases may not necessarily mean 
that a universal conception of dignity does not exist, but suggest only that a universal 
understanding of dignity does not exist  at the margins . 
 Could a more sophisticated methodology be adopted? A richer approach would 
examine much more carefully the judicial discourse in particular countries in their 
historical, social, cultural, political, and legal contexts. This type of study is already 
underway in some countries where studies of the meaning of dignity in legal discourse 
in this richer sense have been completed. 376 Analysis of dignity discourse in the judicial 
 374  I am grateful to Denise Réaume for this point. 
 375  R. Dworkin,  Taking Rights Seriously (2007), at chap. 4. 
 376  Dupré,  Importing the Law, supra note 303 (discussing Hungary); Kamir,  ‘ Honor and Dignity Cultures: the 
Case of Kavod (Honor) and Kvod Ha-adam (Dignity) in Israeli Society and Law ’ , in Kretzmer and Klein, 
 supra note 4, at 231 (discussing Israel); Whitman,  ‘ On Nazi  “ Honour ” and the New European  “ Dignity ” ’ , in 
C. Joerges and N.S. Ghaleigh (eds),  Darker Legacies of Law in Europe (2003), at 243 (discussing Germany). 
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context is, however, in its relative infancy, and even fewer attempts have been made 
to provide cross-cultural studies of the use of dignity in judicial discourse using these 
richer methods. Such work will be an important resource in the future. If such work 
is undertaken, as I hope it will be, it will however need to tackle the immensely dif-
ﬁ cult issue of how to deal with the concept of human dignity in different languages. 
Orit Kamir, for example, has stressed the important substantive implications in Israeli 
human rights interpretation of translating  ‘ dignity ’ using the Hebrew word  ‘ kavod ’ . 377 
I suspect, but cannot prove, that similar issues arise in other languages. 
 Given these problems, all that can be said is that the account given in this part of the 
article seems to me to show (but by no means incontestably) that judicial interpreta-
tion of the concept of human dignity has contributed little to developing a consensus 
on the implications of any of the three basic elements of the minimum core I sketched 
out earlier, and therefore that no common conception of dignity is yet discernible. Dig-
nity discourse has, so far at least, done little to provide a conception with signiﬁ cant 
enough substantive content to solve the most profound issues in the judicial resolu-
tion of human rights claims: the appropriate balance between the individual and the 
community, including such questions as the appropriate limits on individual freedom; 
the appropriateness of the use of state power to ensure basic standards of material 
security; what rights should be attributed at the beginning of life and at the end of 
life; and how far we have responsibilities to ourselves and to the community. Nor, in 
the words of Weisstub, does it  ‘ inform us about whether the core and substance of 
human dignity is best articulated through a consensus morality, if it can be located 
alternatively among the professional elite of the judiciary, or whether it can only be 
articulated over a long process through the amalgamation and interaction with other 
rights, values, principles and rules established nationally and trans-nationally in law 
and legislation ’ . 378 We are left, then with an apparently descriptively more accurate, 
but normatively disappointing, conclusion that in the judicial interpretation of human 
rights there is no common substantive  conception of dignity, although there appears to 
be an acceptance of the  concept of dignity. 
 6   Finding the Use of Dignity in Process 
 But perhaps it is too ambitious to assess the utility of dignity in human rights adju-
dication on the basis of whether it either creates or instantiates a  substantive con-
ception of human dignity. Perhaps we should think more modestly and ask whether 
dignity plays a different role. At this point in the article, we turn from the issue of 
whether there has been a substantive consolidation of the meaning of human dig-
nity to consider the  institutional use of the concept in human rights adjudication. My 
argument in this part of the article is that the  ‘ common enterprise ’ which Carozza 
and I both agree is occurring is not  ‘ the working out of the practical implications, in 
 377  Kamir,  supra note 376. 
 378  Weisstub,  supra note 162, at 274. 
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differing concrete contexts, of human dignity ’ , as Carozza would have it, 379 but rather 
the establishment of a recognizably workable system of judicial interpretation and 
application of human rights. In this context, the concept of human dignity provides a 
useful, but limited, language with which to address certain institutional difﬁ culties to 
which human rights adjudication gives rise. 
 Although dignity has yet to assist in providing a shared  substantive basis for judicial 
decision-making, 380 dignity has, however, provided something else to human rights 
adjudicators. Weisstub’s analysis provides a useful starting point:  ‘ what is interesting 
about human dignity is how it colours differently, depending upon the social needs in 
question. Its centrality and attractiveness for global ethics may be, thereby, its mal-
leability rather than the tightness of its logic.  … To say this in no way throws into 
question the rhetorical value or  even the constitutional attractiveness of the claims or 
projections about human dignity. ’ 381 Wherein lies this constitutional attractiveness? 
I will argue in the remainder of this article that we can identify from the previous 
analysis a distinctively useful  institutional function which dignity plays in judicial 
interpretation, one that fulﬁ ls a need occasioned by the institutional characteristics of 
judicial decision-making in human rights adjudication. In other words, dignity plays 
an important legal-institutional function. I am not arguing that all judicial decision-
making should be seen from the functionalist perspective which this particular argu-
ment presents. My more limited argument in this concluding part of the article is that 
the judicial use of dignity in human rights adjudication should not be seen only from 
the perspective of universalistic naturalism or from the perspective of pluralistic cul-
tural relativism. Rather, we should see the role that dignity plays in adjudication at 
least partly from an  institutional perspective. 382 If this analysis is correct, one implica-
tion would be that the use of dignity in human rights adjudication may, therefore, be 
rather different from its use in other contexts and social systems. 
 A   Judicial Review’s Institutional Problems 
 At least since the Second World War, courts have increasingly been given (or taken 
on) a role in interpreting and applying constitutional and human rights, sometimes 
in specially created constitutional courts, sometimes in courts of general jurisdiction, 
and sometimes in administrative courts. Such adjudication usually involves the judi-
ciary being asked to adjudicate on disputes which involve an allegation of a breach of 
a claimed right by a public body such as a department of government, or by the legis-
lature itself. This role of the courts is controversial not least because it runs the risk of 
creating tension with other constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers. 
Where judicial review involves judges striking down legislation on the ground that 
 379  Carozza,  supra note 291, at 1081 – 1082. 
 380  Feldman,  ‘ Human Dignity as a Legal Value ’ [1999]  Public Law 682, at 698. 
 381  Weisstub,  supra note 162, at 265 (emphasis added). 
 382  My approach in this article, focussing on the judicial-institutional context of the interpretation of dignity, 
is close to what Tushnet terms  ‘ contextualism ’ : Tushnet,  supra note 293, at 10, in this article, focussing 
on the judicial-institutional context of the interpretation of dignity. 
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it breaches constitutional or human rights, it is particularly controversial because a 
body of unelected judges calls into question the decision of a democratically elected 
body, leading to the so-called  ‘ counter-majoritarian difﬁ culty ’ . These tensions have 
led to a continuing debate about the legitimacy of judicial review, particularly of this 
strong type, and how far it is compatible with notions of democratic self-government. 
In all the jurisdictions which have adopted dignity in their judicial decision-making, 
judicial review in the human rights context is more or less controversial, constantly 
aiming to justify itself, its methods, and its reasoning. 
 There are at least three particular institutional problems which are commonly iden-
tiﬁ ed with human rights adjudication which courts use dignity to help to deal with. 
The ﬁ rst arises from the need to decide how to resolve conﬂ icts of rights, and conﬂ icts 
between rights and other values. The second arises from the need to decide how far 
the rights which are to be interpreted should be seen as instantiating international 
standards, as opposed to how far they should be seen as protecting more national or 
local concerns where there is a conﬂ ict. The third arises from the need to decide how 
far the text of the national (or regional, or international) Bill of Rights should be seen 
as determinative, and how to react when the text appears not to support a strong judi-
cial desire to intervene. I will consider each in turn. 
 B   Conﬂ icts of Values and the Problem of Incommensurability 
 I begin with the problem of how to handle conﬂ icts of rights and conﬂ icts between 
rights and other values. A key feature of this problem is the issue whether these rights 
and other values can be  ‘ balanced ’ against each other. To engage in  ‘ balancing ’ is 
clearly a metaphor in this context. We can balance an amount of sugar against an 
amount of ﬂ our because both have mass and weight and we therefore have a common 
measure to compare them by. Frequently, however, rights and other values are said to 
be incommensurable. Incommensurability is essentially the theory, ﬁ rst popularized 
by Isaiah Berlin, 383 that some values cannot be compared against each other, and this 
has been taken up in the legal context. John Alder, for example, argues that there is 
no single, ultimate scale or principle against which to compare conﬂ icting values  – no 
 ‘ moral slide-rule ’ or universal unit of measurement. 384 
 The  Evans case is a prime example of an intra-rights conﬂ ict being seen to give rise 
to a problem of incommensurability. Mrs Evans was diagnosed with cancer in both 
ovaries and they had to be removed. The hospital advised her that it would be possible 
to  ‘ harvest ’ her eggs, fertilize them with the gametes of her husband, and freeze them 
so that they might have a child in future. Her relationship with her husband broke 
down and he asked for the gametes to be destroyed. The British legislation allowed the 
withdrawal of consent at any time pre-implantation. Mrs Evans wanted the gametes 
preserved so that she could have a baby. Legally, the case was presented as involv-
ing a conﬂ ict between Mrs Evans ’ Article 8 right to found a family and her former 
 383  I. Berlin,  Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (ed. H. Hardy, 2002). 
 384  Alder,  ‘ The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights ’ [2006]  Public Law 697. 
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husband’s Article 8 right to protection of his private life. Before the issue reached the 
ECtHR, the English Court of Appeal rejected Mrs Evans ’ claim, Sedley LJ stating that 
the claim would  ‘ require a balance to be struck between two entirely incommensura-
ble things. Whatever decision was arrived at might be capable of being explained but 
would be practically impossible to justify. ’ 385 Arden LJ similarly stated that the court 
had no point of reference by which to make such a decision. 386 The Grand Chamber 
held that there was no violation of the Convention. 387 
 One approach to conﬂ icts of this kind is to say that resolving such conﬂ icts is not a 
role for the courts. So, for example, Alder argues that when we reach the stage where 
values conﬂ ict, we must employ human emotions to resolve the conﬂ ict. The legisla-
ture, Alder argues, is the best forum for the discovery and application of such emo-
tions. The courts have no special insight into the issue and the legislature is ultimately 
more suited. Translated into court-talk, courts should defer to the legislature. Effec-
tively, this is what the ECtHR did in  Evans . Another possible approach is for the court 
to resort to utilitarian balancing. Consider the  A case, 388 involving the issue whether 
detention of alleged terrorists without trial was contrary to Articles 5 and 6 of the 
ECHR. We could convert the argument to a purely utilitarian form, something like the 
greatest good for the greatest number, asking the court to consider whether the dam-
age of holding a person in a prison without allowing him to plead his innocence in a 
court is greater than the potential effect on national security of letting him free. Apart 
from the fact that this seems to be the type of decision which legislatures (perhaps even 
the Executive) are better able to make than courts, there is another problem. If we take 
liberty not as a utilitarian consideration but as an intrinsic value, valuable in and of 
itself, then it seems difﬁ cult to perform the utilitarian balancing act between the two. 
 There are various other ways of addressing the problem of such conﬂ icts. An 
approach which is often, perhaps increasingly, adopted is for the court to adopt pro-
portionality as a tool by which it can structure its analysis of the conﬂ ict. There are 
many variations in the ways courts formulate proportionality, 389 but for my purposes 
nothing hangs on these differences. Essentially, each formulation has several com-
mon elements: ﬁ rst, where a limit is placed on a claimed right, the court should ﬁ rst 
establish whether that limit furthers a legitimate aim; secondly, the court should con-
sider whether the means chosen to achieve this aim are rationally connected to that 
aim; thirdly, the court should consider whether the measure is proportionate in the 
strict sense, meaning that the court should consider whether there are any means 
available to achieve the objective which are less restrictive of the claimed right, and 
whether the beneﬁ ts of restriction outweigh the harms. 
 A problem which is commonly identiﬁ ed with proportionality analysis, however, 
is that the proportionality test requires the injection of a signiﬁ cant element of value 
 385  Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 727, at para. 66. 
 386  Ibid., at para. 110. 
 387  Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 EHRR (2007) 21. 
 388  A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 WLR 87 (HL). 
 389  Silver and Others v. UK, 5 EHRR (1993) 347, at para. 97. 
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judgement in at least two particular parts of the test: in determining whether the aim 
of the restrictive measure furthers a  legitimate objective, and in carrying out the ﬁ nal 
balancing exercise. Courts applying the proportionality test will need to determine 
what constitutes a legitimate aim and its  ‘ weight ’ , and what the  ‘ weight ’ of the right 
is that is being limited by the challenged measure. Rather than solving the problem 
of incommensurability, the court is still faced with the problem and the courts resort 
to similar techniques described in the previous paragraphs: deference to legislative 
judgment, creating a hierarchy of rights, engaging in crude utilitarian balancing, or, 
as Waldron 390 identiﬁ es, requiring that reasons be given explaining the considerations 
upon which the governmental decision was arrived at and scrutinizing the adequacy 
of such reasons. 
 The use of dignity is particularly associated with those jurisdictions which have 
adopted proportionality analysis, whether that word is used or not. That is not coinci-
dental, I think. One important institutional function for dignity is to provide a language 
in which courts can indicate the weighting given to particular rights and other values 
in this context. When a particular right or other value is described as engaging dig-
nity, this indicates that the court considers that considerable (even in some cases over-
whelming) weight should be attributed to it. 391 Let us reconsider the  First Abortion Case 
in this light. The German Constitutional Court (FCC) addressed the constitutionality of 
the Abortion Reform Act of 1974, which liberalized some restrictions on abortion. The 
Act was challenged as unconstitutional. In deciding the case, the FCC identiﬁ ed the con-
ﬂ icting interests at stake as the mother’s right to personality under Article 2(1) and the 
state’s duty to protect life under Article 2(2). Faced with balancing the mother’s rights 
and the state’s duty to protect life, the FCC turned to dignity. The Court identiﬁ ed dig-
nity as the supreme value in German law, stating that  ‘ [i]n the ensuing balancing pro-
cess, both constitutional values must be perceived in their relation to human dignity as 
the centre of the Constitution’s value system ’ . 392 Although this statement implies that 
dignity is a superior value guiding the interpretation of the scope of  both rights, the FCC 
went on heavily to emphasize dignity’s connection to the life interest, declaring that 
 ‘ [h]uman life  … is the vital basis of human dignity and the prerequisite of all other basic 
rights ’ . 393 By combining dignity with the state’s duty to protect life, dignity became a 
technique whereby the court was able to apply stricter scrutiny to derogations from the 
state’s duty to protect life and consequently restrict the rights of the mother. Once dig-
nity entered the balancing calculus on the side of the life interest, the conclusion that 
 390  Waldron,  ‘ Fake Incommensurability ’ , 45  Hastings LJ (1994) 813. 
 391  In addition to the cases discussed in the text see also  R. (Carson) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2006] 1 AC 173 (HL). For a useful discussion see Baker,  ‘ Comparison Tainted by Justiﬁ cation Against a 
 “ Compendious Question ” in Art. 14 Discrimination ’ [2006]  Public Law 476. 
 392  BverfGE 39, 1, quoting BverfGE 35, 202. The court emphasized the life interest as a community value 
rather than an individual right belonging to the foetus, although the court did recognize that  ‘ [t]he po-
tential capabilities inherent in human existence from its inception are adequate to establish human dig-
nity ’ . 
 393  Ibid . 
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the protection of the foetus’s life must receive priority over the women’s freedom was 
inevitable. Thus, the FCC relied heavily on dignity to tip the scales in favour of ﬁ nding 
the act unconstitutional, and restrict the rights of the mother. 
 So too, in the  Aviation Security Act Case , 394 dignity performed a similar function to 
the one it played in the  First Abortion Case . In this case, the FCC addressed the con-
stitutionality of a law which empowered the Minister of Defence to shoot down a 
hijacked passenger plane where it was being used as a guided bomb similar to the 
way in which the planes were used on 9/11. The FCC decided that, despite its poten-
tial to avert a major disaster and save thousands of lives, the law was impermissible 
because it infringed the guarantee of human dignity to the extent that it allowed the 
lives of innocent people to be taken to save the lives of others. The FCC’s use of dig-
nity here resembles the use of dignity in the  First Abortion Case because in both cases 
the FCC invoked dignity in conjunction with the right to life in order to imbue that 
right with a weight which justiﬁ ed the application of strict scrutiny when assessing 
whether incursions into the right were acceptable, and found that they were not. 395 
When the court deems that dignity is not a factor, however, less weight is attributed 
to the life interest, and hence incursions into rights can once again be justiﬁ ed. Thus, 
the FCC concluded that, if terrorists are alone on the plane, shooting the plane down 
would be proportionate because the criminals are not being treated as objects;  ‘ [o]n 
the contrary, it corresponds to the position of the aggressor as a subject to make him 
accountable for the consequences of his autonomous actions ’ . 396 
 So, too, when the FCC in the  Second Abortion decision wanted to give greater weight 
to the rights of the woman, it began using the concept of dignity to describe those 
rights, thus indicating that they should be accorded greater recognition than in the 
 First Abortion decision. In the  Second Abortion decision, the FCC departed from its tech-
nique of attributing dignity primarily to the life interest in the foetus. Instead, the Court 
placed dignity on both sides of the rights-balancing equation, stating  ‘ [w]here the 
woman’s constitutional rights, namely her right to free development of her personal-
ity  … and to the protection of her dignity, collides with the duty to protect the unborn, 
the conﬂ ict must be solved in accordance with the principle of proportionality ’ . 397 
Unlike in the  First Abortion case, the woman’s right to personality, and not just foetal 
life, was seen to engage dignity. Dignity was no longer used to tip the scales in favour 
of the life interest. Rather, dignity’s association with both sides of the conﬂ ict resulted 
in the decision that the state’s duty to protect life and the woman’s basic rights must be 
balanced. 398 Consequently, the character of the opinion was decidedly more respectful 
of the woman’s rights and reﬂ ected a more even-handed balancing overall. 
 394  BverfGE, 1 BvR 357/05. 
 395  See Möller,  ‘ On Treating Persons as Ends: The German Aviation Security Act, Human Dignity, and the 
Federal Constitutional Court ’ [2006]  Public Law 457. 
 396  Ibid., at 462. 
 397  BverfGE 88, 208, 2 BvF 2/90, 2BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92 (1993), at 164. 
 398  It is not clear whether the FCC conceived that woman’s dignity here is afﬁ liated solely with the right to life 
or her right to personality, but the FCC appears to be associating dignity with both rights. 
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 The  Second Abortion decision also illustrates the use of dignity as providing a com-
mon metric within which balancing of apparently incommensurable values can take 
place, and a metric which is not simply expressed as utilitarian. This, too, is a com-
mon practice in other courts which use proportionality. So, for example, in the  South 
African Port Elizabeth Municipality case, 399 the city sought an eviction order against 
a group of individuals occupying private land. Although the City proposed that the 
group move to a different piece of land, the individuals rejected the offer because the 
proposed site of relocation was crime-ridden, crowded, and would not offer them 
security from another eviction. The City had housing to serve the needs of the poor, 
but contended that allowing individuals to receive priority in the allocation of this 
housing was tantamount to rewarding them for illegally occupying land. The Court 
found itself in a situation of conﬂ icting rights: the right of the landowners not to suffer 
arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of their land, and the right of the squatters to have 
access to adequate housing. Sachs J was clearly unwilling simply to use a utilitar-
ian approach to resolve the conﬂ ict:  ‘ [i]n a society founded on human dignity, equal-
ity and freedom it cannot be presupposed that the greatest good for the many can be 
achieved at the cost of intolerable hardship for the few, particularly if by a reason-
able application of judicial and administrative statecraft such human distress could 
be avoided ’ . 400 Instead, in deciding the case, the Court emphasized that the  ‘ starting 
and ending point of the analysis must be to afﬁ rm the values of human dignity, equal-
ity, and freedom ’ . 401 The Court made no attempt to identify dignity with only one side 
of the conﬂ ict, but rather concluded that both rights pertained to property and were 
underpinned by dignity. Given that they were commensurate, the Court’s role was to 
seek the solution that would best comport with dignity. When the Court decided that 
it would not uphold the eviction order, it justiﬁ ed its decision to limit the right of the 
landowners to be free from unlawful deprivation of their land as being the choice more 
congruent with dignity. 
 Consider the similar role of dignity in the context of freedom of expression in the 
Canadian Supreme Court cases considering obscenity and hate speech. Traditionally, 
in both these contexts, other jurisdictions (perhaps particularly the United States) 
have contrasted the right to freedom of expression against the mere  ‘ interests ’ of the 
government, and have come down heavily in favour of freedom of speech. In contrast, 
in the Canadian cases, the interests of the government were reformulated in dignity 
terms, and the result was markedly different. Thus, in  Keegstra , 402 we saw earlier that 
Dickson CJ conceptualized the protection accorded by the legal restrictions on hate 
speech as heavily engaging dignity. The majority considered that the right to free-
dom of speech was also underpinned by dignity.  ‘ Freedom of expression is a crucial 
aspect of the democratic commitment, not merely because it permits the best policies 
to be chosen from among a wide array of proffered options, but additionally because 
 399  Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers , 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (Const Ct S Africa). 
 400  Ibid., at para. 29. 
 401  Ibid., at para. 15. 
 402  R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 (Sup Ct Canada). 
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it helps to ensure that participation in the political process is open to all persons. 
Such open participation must involve to a substantial degree the notion that all 
persons are equally deserving of respect and dignity. ’ 403 Since dignity is engaged 
on both sides of the conﬂ ict, therefore, dignity again provides a metric common to 
both, and thus the solution must be that which most comports with dignity. In this 
case, according to the majority, since the speech is one that undermines dignity, the 
dignity-based reasons why speech ordinarily should be protected from interference 
are substantially reduced.  ‘ I am very reluctant to attach anything but the highest 
importance to expression relevant to political matters. But given the unparalleled 
vigour with which hate propaganda repudiates and undermines democratic val-
ues, and in particular its condemnation of the view that all citizens need be treated 
with equal respect and dignity so as to make participation in the political process 
meaningful, I am unable to see the protection of such expression as integral to the 
democratic ideal so central to the  … rationale [for protecting free speech].  … [T]his 
conclusion leads me to disagree with the opinion of [the dissent] that the expression 
at stake in this appeal mandates the most solicitous degree of constitutional protec-
tion. In my view, hate propaganda should not be accorded the greatest of weight in 
the [proportionality] analysis. ’ 404 
 C   Domesticating and Contextualizing Human Rights 
 How far should human rights instantiate international or local standards? Carozza 
argues that there  ‘ is an inherent tension in international human rights law ’ between 
upholding a universal understanding of human rights and  ‘ respecting the diversity 
and freedom of human cultures. ’ 404a For Carozza, the principle of subsidiarity  ‘ gives 
us a conceptual tool to mediate the polarity of pluralism and the common good in a 
globalized world …. ’ 404b But so, too, does the concept of human dignity. For example, it 
allowed the South African court in  Port Elizabeth to contextualize its decision in light of 
the history of apartheid. 405 It allowed the Supreme Court of Canada to pick and choose 
what it regarded as discriminatory, based on local perceptions of what was contrary 
to dignity. 406 As the Chief Justice explained in  Gosselin,  ‘ To determine whether a dis-
tinction made on an enumerated or analogous ground is discriminatory, we must 
examine its context.  … In each case, we must ask whether the distinction, viewed 
in context, treats the subject as less worthy, less imbued with human dignity, on the 
basis of an enumerated or analogous ground. ’ 407 It enabled the South African Consti-
tutional Court to decide when  ‘ equality ’ required equal treatment and when it did not. 
 403  Ibid., at 764. 
 404  Ibid., at 765. 
 404a  Paolo G Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97  AJIL 
(2003) at 1. 
 404b  Ibid. 
 405  2004 (12) BCLR, at paras 9 – 10. 
 406   Gosselin v Quebec [2002] SCC 84 (Sup Ct Canada), at para. 24 (McLachlin CJ). 
 407  Ibid., at para. 24. 
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As Sachs J explained in  Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie , 408  ‘ [i]t is precisely sensitivity 
to context and impact that suggest that equal treatment does not invariably require 
identical treatment.  … The crucial determinant will always be whether human dig-
nity is enhanced or diminished and the achievement of equality is promoted or under-
mined by the measure concerned. ’ 409 
 Indeed, some scholars have argued that this function of dignity has been vital 
in particular jurisdictions, not just in the context of individual cases but more 
generally. Dupré has argued that the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s use of 
dignity can best be explained as  ‘ being used ﬁ rst and foremost to break with the 
socialist law ’ . 410 Given the resistance during the transition to democracy to any 
resurrection of the despised egalitarianism of Communist ideology, it is not surpris-
ing that a non-redistributive justice approach to equality should be adopted. Dignity 
was ideally placed to supply an alternative theory in this context, and we should not 
be surprised, therefore, to ﬁ nd it heavily used by the Court. Dupré argues convinc-
ingly that the  ‘ task of negating and destroying the former domestic [Communist] 
legal system has gone hand in hand, in constitutional case-law, with the founda-
tion of a new order based on non-indigenous elements ’ . 411 Human dignity allowed 
the court to import these non-indigenous elements into Hungarian law, primarily 
from German constitutional law, but only to the extent that this was perceived as 
suiting the local need  ‘ to reorient the conception of fundamental rights  … from a 
communist concept of rights to a liberal one ’ . 412 In order to accomplish this switch, 
the Court  ‘ used imported law in its early case law as a modern substitute for natural 
law, in that it enabled the Court to base its reasoning on new supra-constitutional 
values, while presenting them in a legal guise. At the same time, the use of imported 
law is couched in a discourse of globalization or ius commune, in which the Court 
presents itself as an active participant. ’ 413 
 The point is not simply that the concept of dignity is vague and open to interpreta-
tion and gives judges discretion; in that it does not differ from all human rights obli-
gations and rights. Rather, my argument is that, just as dignity played a signiﬁ cant 
role politically in smoothing over the transition to human rights in the post-Second 
World War period at the international level, so too dignity is playing a similar 
role judicially, enabling rights to be interpreted in a way that domesticates them. 
Its role, in practice, is to enable local context to be incorporated under the appear-
ance of using a universal principle. Dignity, in the judicial context, not only permits 
the incorporation of local contingencies in the interpretation of human rights norms; 
it requires it. Dignity allows each jurisdiction to develop its own practice of human 
rights. 
 408  2006 (3) BCLR 355 (Const Ct), at para. 152 (Sachs J). 
 409  Ibid., at para. 152. 
 410  Dupré, in European Commission for Democracy in Law,  supra note 14, at 72. 
 411  Ibid., at sect. 1(B). 
 412  Dupré,  Importing the Law, supra note 303, at 6. 
 413  Ibid., at 157. 
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 D   Justifying the Creation of New, and the Extension of Existing, Rights 
 Dignity has functioned, thirdly, as a source from which new rights may be derived, 
and existing rights extended. In the Israeli context, for example, human dignity has 
been seen as providing a basis on which to import rights that had not, intentionally, 
been included in the text of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. As Kretzmer 
observes,  ‘ the Basic Law does not mention many of the fundamental rights that are 
protected under most constitutions and international human rights instruments  … . 
The most blatant exclusions are equality, freedom of religion and conscience and free-
dom of speech. ’ 414 These were excluded because of the inability to generate a con-
sensus among the parties in the Knesset that they should be included at that time. 
Notably, several of the religious parties objected to their inclusion. Given that the self-
perceived role of the Israeli Supreme Court is to assist in the building of an Israel that 
is committed to the broad range of human rights, that was unsatisfying. Conceptual-
izing human dignity as a general value  ‘ has enabled the Court to resort to the concept 
to create rights in various situations ’ , including in those contexts where the excluded 
rights would otherwise have been expected to operate. 415 In some cases, the Court has 
used this method to recognize precisely those rights which were deliberately omitted 
from the Basic Law because of the lack of political consensus. 416 For example, in the 
 Hupert case, the Court asserted that the right to equality could be derived from human 
dignity and as a consequence merited constitutional protection. 417 Other rights that 
have been derived from dignity in a similar manner include freedom of religion, the 
right to strike, the right of minors not to be subject to corporal punishment, and the 
right to know the identity of one’s parents. 418 
 A somewhat similar approach can be identiﬁ ed in the UK House of Lords ’  Limbuela 
decision, 419 in which the claims of three asylum seekers who applied for judicial review 
of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act were considered under the Human 
Rights Act 1998, which effectively incorporated the ECHR into domestic UK law. The 
challenged legislation had revoked the authority of the Secretary of State to provide 
support for asylum seekers who did not make a recorded claim for asylum as soon as 
reasonably practicable after arriving in the UK. Nor were such asylum seekers permit-
ted to work, even where they were destitute. The asylum seekers contended that the 
regime diminished their human dignity and violated Article 3 of the ECHR , which pro-
vided an absolute prohibition on torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment. Dig-
nity was the standard for determining whether treatment rose to the level of inhuman 
or degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3. Discussing the types of treatment 
falling within Article 3, Lord Craighead wrote,  ‘ Where treatment humiliates or debases 
an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity 
 414  Kretzmer,  supra note 210, at 162. 
 415  Ibid., at 172. 
 416  Ibid . 
 417  Ibid . 
 418  Ibid . 
 419  R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., ex parte Limbuela [2005] UKHL 66 (HL). 
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or arouses feelings of fear, anguish,  … it may be characterized as degrading and also 
fall within the prohibition of article 3 ’ . 420 The House agreed that the statutory regime 
violated Article 3 because, by denying the asylum seekers state support at the same 
time as effectively cutting off self-support measures (applicants could not work without 
permission, which took a minimum of 12 months to obtain), the state actions resulted 
in treatment that was severe enough to be considered inhuman or degrading. 
 E   Reacting to the Institutional Uses of Dignity 
 How should we react to these institutional uses of dignity? Some may see the three 
uses of dignity as merely rhetorical. The courts use the concept of dignity merely to 
disguise, for example, the absence of a theory on how to resolve conﬂ ict between 
incommensurable values. Instead of making a choice between conﬂ icting rights, they 
present the conﬂ ict as an issue internal to dignity. Some may well consider that this 
approach obscures the moral issues which give rise to conﬂ icts of rights, pretending 
that the problem is the absence of a common metric, where the real disagreement is 
deeper. There may be a similar reaction to the other uses of dignity discussed in this 
part of the article. If these arguments are accepted, then from a substantive point of 
view, dignity is a placeholder, but it has taken on a rhetorical function in these three 
distinct contexts to give judges something to say when they confront the really hard 
issues. This counts as  ‘ ﬁ nding the use of dignity ’ , but not in a way that some read-
ers will see as normatively attractive, since it seems merely to provide a smokescreen 
behind which substantive judgments are being made, but unarticulated as such, and 
therefore uncontestable. Some, indeed, may consider this as a breach of the Rule of 
Law which, as conceptualized by Raz, requires decisions to be open, prospective, and 
clear, such that individuals are able to plan their lives around them. 421 Critics of 
pluralistic visions of human rights may well argue that the techniques of  ‘ domesticat-
ing ’ human rights discussed above undermine the predictability necessary to create a 
functioning approach to human rights and in extreme forms allows for total deroga-
tion from human rights norms by tolerating all deviations. Others may see the uses of 
dignity described in this part of the article as anti-democratic. This article is not the 
place to consider whether these arguments are convincing. My only purpose, I repeat, 
is to identify what seems to me to  explain the increasing popularity of the concept of 
dignity among judges and advocates, not to justify these uses of dignity. 
 7   Conclusion 
 Dignity has undoubtedly played a pivotal political role in enabling different cultures 
with vastly different conceptions of the state, differing views on the basis of human 
rights, and differing ethical and moral viewpoints to put aside these deep ideological 
differences and agree instead to focus on the speciﬁ c practices of human rights abuses 
 420  Ibid., at para. 76 (Baroness Hale). 
 421  Raz,  ‘ The Rule of Law and its Virtue ’ , 93  LQR (1997) 195. 
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that should be prohibited, as Maritain suggested. Dignity has helped to achieve this 
by enabling all to agree that human rights are founded on dignity. A basic minimum 
content of the meaning of human dignity can be discerned: that each human being 
possesses an intrinsic worth that should be respected, that some forms of conduct are 
inconsistent with respect for this intrinsic worth, and that the state exists for the indi-
vidual not vice versa. The fault lines lie in disagreement on what that intrinsic worth 
consists in, what forms of treatment are inconsistent with that worth, and what the 
implications are for the role of the state. 422 
 Although a more speciﬁ c common theory going beyond the minimum core con-
tent was not necessary for the political acceptance of the Charter and the Universal 
Declaration, or for the acceptance of the subsequent human rights texts at the inter-
national, regional, and domestic levels, and attempts to generate one might well have 
been counter-productive, this did not help much when it came to the judicial inter-
pretation of those speciﬁ c rights that were enacted. When judges read their texts and 
found that these rights were founded on human dignity, or found that there was a 
right to dignity as such, it was not surprising that some considered that dignity should 
be given a more substantive content. It is signiﬁ cant that dignity is so often drawn on 
where there is some personal security issue at stake (torture, death), where equality is 
at stake (including as a basis for limiting other rights like freedom of expression), and 
where some forms of autonomy are at stake (abortion, sexual practices). This might 
have led (and may still lead) to the development, through discussion among judges 
nationally and transnationally, 423 of an agreed transnational, transcultural, non-
ideological, humanistic, non-positivistic, individualistic-yet-communitarian concep-
tion of human dignity which was absent when the Charter and the Declaration were 
being drafted. I understand Carozza to be arguing that this is what is currently under-
way. But, although we see judges often speaking in terms of  ‘ common principles for a 
common humanity ’ , in practice this is often rhetoric, however well intentioned and 
sincere. We appear to have signiﬁ cant consensus on the common core, but not much 
else. 
 I am  not arguing that there is no more precise conception of human dignity that is 
possible beyond this minimum content. Nor am I arguing that there is no coherent 
extra-legal conception of dignity which could form the basis of a common transna-
tional legal approach. The problem is rather the opposite: as the historical examina-
tion of the development of dignity indicated, there are several conceptions of dignity 
that one can choose from, but one cannot coherently hold all of these conceptions at 
the same time. Dignity appears to become other than impossibly vague only when it is 
tethered to a coherent community of interpretation. 424 It could be, therefore, that the 
 422  See also Feldman,  ‘ Human Dignity as a Legal Value  – Part II ’ , [2001]  Public Law 61, at 75. 
 423  See, however, C. Gearty,  Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (2004), at 88, where he adopts the view 
that the place where the appropriate conception of human dignity should be resolved  ‘ is ideally the legis-
lative assembly in which the representatives of the people meet to make rules for their society ’ . 
 424  For an interesting attempt to do so in comparing the judicial use of dignity in the US and Germany see E.J. 
Eberle,  Dignity and Liberty: Constitutional Visions in Germany and the United States (2001). 
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interpretation of dignity within Catholic social doctrine, or within a social democratic 
framework, or within an Islamic framework, or within the Jewish tradition, or based 
on Kant, might fulﬁ l this role. But none of these currently provides a consensus con-
ception of the legal use of dignity, and I am sceptical whether any of these could really 
provide a secure foundation for its judicial application in the future. When any one of 
these conceptions is adopted, dignity loses its attractiveness as a basis for generating 
consensus with those who do not share that tradition. 
 The central meaning of dignity remains the common minimum core and judicial 
interpretation has done little, so far, to help us move beyond this. So far, the use of the 
concept of human dignity has not given rise to a detailed universal interpretation, nor 
even particularly coherent national interpretations. No one jurisdiction has a coherent 
judicially interpreted conception of dignity across the range of rights, and no coherent 
conception of dignity emerges transnationally. But that does not mean that dignity 
has no role to play in the judicial interpretation of human rights. The absence of a 
consensus substantive meaning of the concept beyond that minimum core has not, it 
seems, prevented it from being used to enable a much looser coordination of human 
rights adjudication to take place, with signiﬁ cant room for disagreement and diver-
gence over speciﬁ c practical applications. Rather than providing substantive mean-
ing, a signiﬁ cant use is institutional: providing a language in which judges can appear 
to justify how they deal with issues such as the weight of rights, the domestication and 
contextualization of rights, and the generation of new or more extensive rights. It is a 
limited role, and (possibly) a different one from that played in philosophical, religious, 
and political debate, but it seems to me to go some way towards explaining its current, 
and I predict future, judicial popularity in human rights adjudication. 
